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Hon. Richard D. Cudahy† and Alan Devlin†† 
  INTRODUCTION   
Legal standards are inherently vulnerable to the substan-
tive limitations of language.1 It is notoriously difficult for law-
makers to demarcate the boundaries of acceptable conduct pre-
cisely. Inherently nebulous terms such as “reasonable,” 
“sufficient,” “foreseeable,” and “justified” pervade the law. Of 
course, this is not to say that it is impossible to craft substan-
tive law with some specificity. One would properly deride a law 
that simply provided that illegal behavior is unlawful. Nor is it 
to say that legislatures are necessarily unjustified in employing 
standards whose borders are somewhat indeterminate.2 But 
when a legislature builds an area of law around a fundamental, 
yet ill-defined, concept, it becomes difficult to craft doctrine 
without relying on conclusory labels. And conclusory labels fall 
prey to hopeless circularity. 
Antitrust is such an area of law. The fundamental premise 
of competition law is straightforward, purporting as it does to 
condemn “anticompetitive” behavior.3 Remarkably, despite the 
concept’s definitive importance, the law has yet to give full def-
inition to this amorphous term. There is widespread agreement 
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 1. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 
DUKE L.J. 557, 600 (1992). 
 2. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and 
Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 62–69 (1992) (explaining when the benefits 
of standards overcome the disadvantages of imprecise definitions).  
 3. See CAMPBELL R. MCCONNELL & STANLEY L. BRUE, ECONOMICS: 
PRINCIPLES, PROBLEMS, AND POLICIES 598 (16th ed. 2005). 
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that monopoly, which is characterized by artificially high prices 
and low levels of market output, is undesirable.4 Thus, most 
agree that plaintiffs or government entities should challenge 
conduct that is likely to result in such conditions under the 
Sherman and Clayton Acts.5 For this reason, almost all advo-
cate the prohibition of horizontal price-fixing, market sharing, 
and merger to monopoly.6 Yet, harmonious interpretation of 
antitrust law disappears outside this narrow band of una-
nimity.7 Scholars vociferously debate the proper reach of anti-
trust laws that seek to regulate commercial behavior in the 
name of social welfare.8 The state of being “anticompetitive” 
lies at the heart of this controversy.9 Unfortunately, multiple 
schools of thought give this concept competing and irreconcila-
ble definitions.10  
The repercussions of the courts’ failure to articulate defini-
tive goals and determinate standards are serious.11 Experts 
continue to debate the proper intellectual foundation of the 
competition laws, which renders a conclusive definition of ob-
jectionable effects elusive.12 It is still unclear whether antitrust 
law should properly be concerned with maximizing aggregate 
or consumer welfare.13 Monopolization standards have been 
 
 4. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966).  
 5. See generally MCCONNELL & BRUE, supra note 3, at 598–600 (describ-
ing the goals of antitrust legislation). 
 6. See Val D. Ricks & R. Chet Loftis, Seeing the Diagonal Clearly: Telling 
Vertical from Horizontal in Antitrust Law, 28 U. TOL. L. REV. 151, 160 n.27 
(1996) (discussing judicial condemnation of these activities). 
 7. See, e.g., Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule 
of Law?, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1375, 1438 n.272 (2009) (explaining that courts 
agree on the goal of antitrust law, but disagree on the goal’s definition).  
 8. See id. 
 9. See id. 
 10. See Michael S. Jacobs, An Essay on the Normative Foundations of An-
titrust Economics, 74 N.C. L. REV. 219, 226–28 (1995) (describing the Harvard 
and Chicago schools of antitrust analysis). 
 11. See Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 
STAN. L. REV. 253, 257 (2003). 
 12. See Barak D. Richman, The Antitrust of Reputation Mechanisms: In-
stitutional Economics and Concerted Refusals to Deal, 95 VA. L. REV. 325, 
327–28 n.7 (2009); Stucke, supra note 7, at 1437–42. 
 13. Compare Dennis W. Carlton & Ken Heyer, Appropriate Antitrust Poli-
cy Towards Single-Firm Conduct 7–8, 16 (Econ. Analysis Grp., Antitrust Div., 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Discussion Paper No. 08-2, 2008), available at http://ssrn 
.com/abstract=1111665 (discussing activities that may raise total welfare 
while harming consumer welfare), with Steven Salop, Exclusionary Conduct, 
Effect on Consumers, and the Flawed Profit-Sacrifice Standard, 73 ANTITRUST 
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characterized as vacuous and self-contradictory.14 In light of 
the recent financial crisis, an aversion to market concentration 
itself has resurfaced.15 Even if one demarcates a single stan-
dard—though such agreement has yet to be reached—
intertemporal effects complicate analysis.16 Platitudes about ef-
ficiency, consumer welfare, and anticompetitive effect abound.17 
But while enforcers, courts, and academics routinely frame 
their findings in such terms, these fundamental concepts re-
main disturbingly ill-defined. The courts cannot even agree 
whether price increases attributable to challenged conduct con-
stitute cognizable harm, absent a distinct showing of a reduc-
tion in output.18 
Of course, antitrust jurisprudence is not entirely nebulous. 
There is indeed widespread consensus that competition law ex-
ists to promote consumer welfare.19 Conduct that is antithetical 
to consumer well-being is thus subject to scrutiny under the 
Sherman Act.20 But this obviously raises a further definitional 
question. Specifically, what constitutes consumer injury? And 
must one prove such injury directly or can it be presumed in 
appropriate circumstances? This seemingly prosaic inquiry in 
fact masks a Pandora’s Box of intricate questions, unsettled 
law, and indeterminate analysis. This Article seeks to investi-
gate, and answer, four of these questions.  
The first, fundamental issue concerns the nature of anti-
trust injury itself. Does harm to the competitive process alone 
suffice to demonstrate a violation of the Sherman Act or must 
such a disruption be tethered to a resulting injury? There are 
strong intuitive reasons for believing that courts should con-
 
L.J. 311, 329–33 (2006) (discussing antitrust’s focus on the consumer welfare 
standard). For further discussion, see Michael L. Katz & Howard A. Shelan-
ski, Mergers and Innovation, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 7 (2007).  
 14. See Elhauge, supra note 11. 
 15. See Am. Bar Ass’n, Interview with J. Thomas Rosch, Commissioner, 
Federal Trade Commission, in ANTITRUST, Spring 2009, at 32, 41. 
 16. See Alan Devlin & Michael Jacobs, Antitrust Divergence and the Lim-
its of Economics, 104 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 6), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1429541. 
 17. See Stucke, supra note 7. 
 18. See infra Part III.A. 
 19. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (stating that 
the Sherman Act creates “a consumer welfare prescription”) (quoting ROBERT 
H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 66 (1978)). 
 20. See Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, 
Consumer Welfare, and Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1020, 1041 (1987). 
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demn unilateral or concerted conduct that quashes otherwise 
viable competition under the antitrust laws, even if the restric-
tion cannot be tied to a concomitant, social benefit. After all, 
competition law purports to facilitate a vigorous competitive 
process, which in turn promises to yield a plethora of social 
benefits.21 Even if one believes that antitrust harm is inextric-
ably linked to the welfare of a protected class, it may not be un-
reasonable to presume injury to that class in the absence of 
competition. The view that antitrust law protects a robust level 
of active competition bears considerable explanatory power, in 
particular for Europe’s antitrust regime.22 Whether it does so in 
the United States is rather more difficult, for although the 
United States rightly views competition as the harbinger of so-
cially desirable outcomes, an interesting question remains un-
settled. Specifically, can a plaintiff challenge the elimination of 
competition under the Sherman Act when it fails to show harm 
that can befall the relevant protected class?23  
The second issue relates to the identity of this “protected 
class.” We have already noted the commonly accepted fact that 
antitrust law seeks to advance consumer welfare.24 But should 
the law be concerned about individual purchasers in a specific 
market or should “consumers” be given a more expansive inter-
pretation? Companies that are manufacturers in one market 
are often important consumers in others.25 Should the law 
adopt a narrow view, and consider the interests of those indi-
viduals who purchase goods or services in the relevant market, 
or should the law consider the well-being of purchasers and sel-
lers in unison? The distinction between “consumer” and “aggre-
gate” welfare is an important one, especially for merger policy, 
but also for the optimal rules brought to bear on product tying, 
predatory pricing, and a host of other historically suspect busi-
 
 21. See MCCONNELL & BRUE, supra note 3.  
 22. This can most readily be traced to Germany’s ordoliberal tradition, 
which has played a significant role in the development of European Commis-
sion competition law. See Nicola Giocoli, Competition Versus Property Rights: 
American Antitrust Law, The Freiburg School, and the Early Years of Euro-
pean Competition Policy, 5 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 747, 773 (2009). 
 23. See Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 533 (7th Cir. 1986). We 
discuss this case in some detail below. See infra Part II.A. 
 24. See also Brodley, supra note 20, at 1020 (explaining that consumer 
welfare is a dominant term in antitrust discourse). 
 25. See Alan Devlin & Bruno Peixoto, Reformulating Antitrust Rules to 
Safeguard Societal Wealth, 13 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 225, 271 (2008) [herein-
after Reformulating Antitrust Rules]. 
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ness practices.26 The courts have yet to devise a specific answer 
to the question of whether competition law should concern itself 
with total welfare, which creates a fundamental dilemma at the 
heart of antitrust jurisprudence.27 
Until the courts specify consumer or aggregate welfare as 
the normative baseline of antitrust analysis, the proper treat-
ment courts should give to numerous forms of behavior remains 
unidentifiable. The most serious ensuing question is whether 
prolonged price increases constitute antitrust harm, absent a 
showing of a restriction in output. Economists typically object 
to behavior that results in reduced consumption and produc-
tion, given the resulting loss in social wealth.28 They are rarely 
preoccupied by questions of distribution.29 But a standard fo-
cused on the well-being of consumers might object to wealth 
transfers in favor of producers, so that price increases are 
themselves worthy of condemnation. This would hold true ir-
respective of whether the heightened cost triggers a reduction 
in market output. The courts are currently split on whether 
output restrictions are the sine qua non of an antitrust of-
fense.30 
The third issue concerns time. Commercial conduct regu-
larly creates asymmetric intertemporal effects, with losses to-
day, but potentially overriding gains tomorrow, and vice versa. 
Can negative repercussions in the present be offset by potential 
gains in the future, thus rendering an otherwise anticompeti-
tive practice innocuous? If the answer is yes at a theoretical 
level, can intertemporal analysis be conducted at all reliably? It 
may be that we can define “anticompetitive” in the abstract and 
 
 26. For one of the authors’ elaborations on this point, see id. passim, 
which explores the impact of an aggregate welfare standard on multiple layers 
of antitrust doctrine. 
 27. But see Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 
1222–23 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that, in order to be relevant to antitrust 
analysis, merger-specific efficiencies must benefit consumers). 
 28. See, e.g., DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN 
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 95–99 (4th ed. 2005). 
 29. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 13 (3d ed. 1986). 
 30. Compare Chi. Prof ’l Sports Ltd. v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 95 F.3d 593, 
597 (7th Cir. 1996) (“The core question in antitrust is output. . . . A high price 
is not itself a violation of the Sherman Act.”), with Les Shockley Racing, Inc. v. 
Nat’l Hot Rod Ass’n, 884 F.2d 504, 508 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that antitrust 
concerns arise “when the restraining force of an agreement or other arrange-
ment affecting trade becomes unreasonably disruptive of market functions such 
as price setting, resource allocation, market entry, or output designation”). 
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yet be incapable of identifying it in practice. Even if intertem-
poral effects can be both calculated and weighed⎯a heroic as-
sumption⎯over what time frame should price and output ef-
fects be considered for the purpose of declaring them 
anticompetitive? Clearly, antitrust law suffers from serious 
epistemological limitations.  
The fourth problem—a related one—involves the tension 
between static and dynamic efficiency. Monopoly is typically 
deemed inimical to consumer welfare, yet such conditions may 
be the driving force of innovation, which promises to yield over-
riding consumer benefits.31 Consumers are apt to be myopic 
proponents of their own interests, taking technological innova-
tion for granted and demanding interoperability in the 
present.32 Thus, in certain situations, anticompetitive condi-
tions can paradoxically be the driving force for overriding pro-
competitive outcomes in the future.33 Yet consumers are unlike-
ly to recognize this fact and indeed may clamor for erroneous 
antitrust intervention to “cure” what are in fact procompetitive 
conditions.34 The fact that competition can remain concealed 
behind heavily concentrated market structures adds yet a fur-
ther layer of complexity to an already intricate concept.  
The purpose of this Article is two-fold. The first task is pre-
scriptive. It highlights the law’s failure to incorporate defini-
tional clarity in the jurisprudence it has created and explains 
the positive repercussions of that shortcoming. The second is 
normative. In addressing the preferred nature of anticompeti-
tive effect, we reach three specific conclusions. First, U.S. law 
should explicitly adopt a specific normative baseline for compe-
tition policy. More specifically, the courts should directly em-
brace the aggregate-welfare model, with qualified exceptions. 
Such action would enable the courts to specify how certain 
 
 31. See Thomas O. Barnett, Interoperability Between Antitrust and Intel-
lectual Property, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 859, 860 (2007); cf. J. Gregory Sidak 
& David J. Teece, Dynamic Competition in Antitrust Law, 5 J. COMPETITION L. 
& ECON. 581, 586–90 (2009) (discussing the relationship between innovation 
and market concentration, but opining that monopoly is not a sine qua non of 
innovation). 
 32. See Alan Devlin et al., Success, Dominance, and Interoperability, 84 
IND. L.J. 1157, 1159 (2009). 
 33. This is most likely to be the case where anticompetitive conditions re-
sult from the grant of intellectual property. 
 34. See Devlin et al., supra note 32, at 1172 (arguing that regulation fo-
cusing on immediate consumer welfare may undermine innovation). 
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practices should be construed.35 The optimal rules applied to 
product tying, predatory pricing, Williamson mergers, and re-
fusals to deal depend intimately on the specific metric by which 
to judge anticompetitive effect. 
Second, to establish anticompetitive effect, a plaintiff 
should be required to demonstrate conduct-specific price in-
creases that are apt to be durable. Given the continuously 
downward-sloping nature of most demand curves, such price 
effects will typically be associated with reductions in market 
output.36 Yet, price increases can take place on the vertical por-
tions of demand curves, which will not result in any declination 
in supply. If a defendant can establish that the price increase 
associated with its challenged conduct was incapable of reduc-
ing consumption in the relevant market, and carried some larg-
er benefit, such proof should be a complete defense. The cir-
cumstances in which we could envision a defendant making 
such a showing, however, are narrow.  
Third, courts and commentators should recognize the grave 
indeterminism that underlies one’s attempt to apply sound 
theory to practice. Given economists’ inability both to quantify 
and to weigh all the competitive effects of a challenged practice, 
we can rarely be completely confident that a scrutinized prac-
tice is anticompetitive or not. Society must therefore accept 
some residual uncertainty concerning what is, and is not, objec-
tionable. In such cases, decision theory provides the avenue of 
last resort.37 
Part I of this Article conducts a brief overview of the devel-
opment of the U.S. antitrust regime. We explore the evolving 
nature of what the Supreme Court has considered to be impro-
per conduct. In doing so, we demonstrate how “anticompetitive 
effect” has taken on a somewhat amorphous nature. Part II be-
gins by explaining how economics bestows this concept with 
theoretical specificity. Economic theory suggests that an aggre-
 
 35. We believe that the most direct result of such an approach would be to 
realign antitrust policy more closely with what the law originally envisioned—
namely, maintaining active levels of competition.  
 36. Indeed, sustained price increases are generally achievable only by first 
reducing market output. See generally CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 28, at 
61–64 (explaining the basics of supply curves). 
 37. One of the authors has recently completed a paper on conducting op-
timal error analysis in antitrust law. See Alan Devlin & Michael Jacobs, Anti-
trust Error, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2010), available at http:// 
ssrn.com/abstract=1573693. 
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gate-welfare model should underlie antitrust doctrine. We ad-
vocate the qualified adoption of this standard. Were the law 
explicitly to embrace this total-welfare approach, however, am-
biguities would still remain. Part III explores a variety of diffi-
cult, ensuing questions. In particular, to what extent, if any, 
does anticompetitive mean more than a “lack of competition” 
under an aggregate-welfare standard? How should the courts 
treat conduct that unquestionably gives rise to enhanced pric-
es, but does not result in observable restrictions in output? And 
how should courts assess practices that result in offsetting in-
tertemporal effects? The answers to these and related questions 
are of considerable importance to the ongoing development of 
U.S. antitrust law. 
I.  THE EVOLVING CONCEPT OF “ANTICOMPETITIVE” 
BEHAVIOR   
The history of U.S. antitrust enforcement is replete with 
instances of directional instability, for the concept of improper 
conduct has proven malleable, confused, and uncertain. 
Enacted in 1890, the Sherman Act prohibits monopolization 
and concerted conduct in restraint of trade.38 Given the infa-
mously opaque language of the statute,39 it fell to the courts to 
give meaning to what Congress proscribed.40 The one transcen-
dent principle that one can derive from the case law is that the 
Sherman Act prohibits “anticompetitive” behavior. Markets 
that are unfettered by rival-imposed restrictions on competition 
are presumed to function more effectively than those which are 
monopolized.41 This assumption, which finds powerful support 
in the economics literature, can fairly be said to drive U.S. anti-
trust policy.42 The conclusion easily follows that courts should 
employ antitrust policy to protect a vigorous process of rivalry, 
such that unilateral or concerted conduct that quashes compe-
tition is rightly condemned under the Sherman Act. The idea 
 
 38. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2006).  
 39. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1183 (1989) (“One can hardly imagine a prescription more 
vague than the Sherman Act’s prohibition of contracts, combinations or con-
spiracies in restraint of trade . . . .”). 
 40. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997).  
 41. See, e.g., Edward Cavanagh, Antitrust Remedies Revisited, 84 OR. L. 
REV. 147, 148 (2005). 
 42. See CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 28, passim. 
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that competition law simply prohibits “anticompetitive” behav-
ior ostensibly provides a satisfactory guiding principle. 
The reality of the modern economy, however, which is char-
acterized by high levels of innovation and faltering dominance 
on the part of many large companies, proves rather more com-
plex than might first appear.43 In the real-life setting, deter-
mining whether many forms of commercial conduct ultimately 
promote or restrict competition proves to be difficult.44 This de-
termination is complicated by the fact that limitations on com-
petition today may deflect that rivalry to an alternative venue, 
where it may yield greater long-run value to society.45 This Ar-
ticle is concerned with the question of whether “anticompeti-
tive” does and should mean more than “a lack of current compe-
tition.” Exploring this issue in detail requires us briefly to 
explore some of the leading judicial pronouncements on the 
purpose of the Sherman Act and the behavior it condemns. 
A. STATUTORY BACKGROUND AND EARLY ANTITRUST 
JURISPRUDENCE 
Congress passed the Sherman Act at a time of powerful 
public aversion to the trusts that had enveloped the economy.46 
As explained by Justice Harlan, “the conviction was universal 
that the country was in real danger from another kind of slav-
ery sought to be fastened on the American people, namely, the 
slavery that would result from aggregations of capital in the 
hands of a few individuals and corporations.”47 Judge Learned 
Hand similarly promoted what some may deem the noneconom-
ic gains of the 1890 Act, observing that no problem “is more 
threatening than the inequality of condition, of wealth, and op-
portunity that has grown within a single generation out of the 
 
 43. See Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 925, 925–31 (2001). 
 44. See, e.g., Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458–59 
(1993) (discussing the difficulty of distinguishing competitive from anticompe-
titive behavior). 
 45. This economic phenomenon underlies the purpose of the intellectual 
property laws that restrict static efficiency to promote a larger gain in dynam-
ic efficiency. See generally WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 297–300 (2003) (ex-
plaining the effect of patent protections on demand and cost curves). 
 46. The oil, steel, railroad, and sugar industries in particular had come 
under the ownership of powerful trusts. 
 47. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 83 (1911) (Har-
lan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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concentration of capital into vast combinations to control pro-
duction and trade and to break down competition.”48 Consistent 
with that view, Judge Learned Hand condemned the actions of 
an efficient company whose only crime was to meet unsatisfied 
consumer demand with ever-increasing capacity and output.49 
Translated into colloquial terms, the court condemned an al-
ready dominant company for continued expansion at the detri-
ment of its rivals.50 From this perspective, it was not the ineffi-
ciency of monopoly that invoked antitrust’s wrath, but the 
sociopolitical power that such dominance bestowed on its hold-
er. Throughout this period, protecting the competitive process 
was clearly the key goal of antitrust policy.51 In its 1940 deci-
sion in Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, the Supreme Court famous-
ly clarified the “evil” at which the Sherman Act was directed.52 
It explained that the “end sought was the prevention of re-
straints to free competition . . . which tended to restrict produc-
tion, raise prices or otherwise control the market to the detri-
ment of purchasers or consumers.”53 
It is not at all clear that the first fifty years of antitrust ju-
risprudence was based on a misconception of original legisla-
tive intent.54 Indeed, there is a strong basis for supposing that 
Congress was not directly concerned with elevating notions of 
economic efficiency beyond other political goals that might be 
implicated by an antitrust regime.55 Instead, the legislature 
likely sought to facilitate a vigorous process of competition that 
would promise to bring about a variety of benefits, which might 
include the diffusion of economic power, reduced levels of con-
 
 48. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 428 n.1 
(2d Cir. 1945). 
 49. Id. at 431 (“[W]e can think of no more effective exclusion than pro-
gressively to embrace each new opportunity as it opened, and to face every 
newcomer with new capacity already geared into a great organization, having 
the advantage of experience, trade connections and the elite of personnel.”). 
 50. See Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370, 
375 (7th Cir. 1986).  
 51. See Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 428 n.1. 
 52. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 493 (3d Cir. 1940). 
 53. Id.  
 54. Cf. BORK, supra note 19, at 19–21 (arguing that the Sherman Act was 
intended to promote economic efficiency). 
 55. See, e.g., Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1051, 1051 (1979). 
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centration, and free access to markets and consumers, as well 
as efficiency gains.56  
But of course the goal sought to be accomplished by the an-
titrust laws is distinct from the manner in which such an end is 
achieved.57 The courts were thus faced with an obvious ques-
tion, the resolution of which was far from axiomatic: what par-
ticular rules best comport with the notion that antitrust should 
impede the sweeping tide of concentration? The specific rules 
enunciated by the courts in the early years of the U.S. antitrust 
regime are instructive.  
Perhaps surprisingly, the story of early U.S. antitrust law 
is one of inaction. The Supreme Court in 1895 allowed a merger 
to monopoly to proceed—a result that would not be counte-
nanced in the twentieth century and beyond.58 Antitrust en-
forcement came of age in the celebrated 1911 case of Standard 
Oil, which established the rule of reason as the primary tool of 
analytic inquiry.59 Under the rule of reason, courts found those 
restraints that reduced competition by more than they pro-
moted it to be illegal under the Sherman Act.60 However, from 
the mid-1910s through Roosevelt’s New Deal, antitrust en-
forcement took a back seat to direct regulatory intervention.61 
One notable trait of the jurisprudence of this time, however, 
concerned intellectual property. In the 1930s and 1940s, the 
Supreme Court viewed intellectual property rights, and patents 
in particular, with significant distaste.62 Given the perceived 
benefits of competition, the Court viewed patent rights as being 
antithetical to the purpose of the Sherman Act. After all, it had 
previously noted that “[t]he very object of [obtaining a patent] 
is monopoly.”63 This view, as we shall see, is telling and its gen-
 
 56. Cf. id. (suggesting that a fear of concentrated economic power and po-
tential gains in efficiency may have been the motivating force behind early an-
titrust statutes). 
 57. See id. 
 58. See United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 11–18 (1895). 
 59. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 66 (1911). 
 60. See id. at 61–62. 
 61. See Giocoli, supra note 22, at 750. 
 62. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE 
AND EXECUTION 250 (2005). 
 63. E. Bement & Sons v. Nat’l Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70, 91 (1902). 
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eral import has vast consequences for optimal antitrust poli-
cy.64 
An especially important case during this time was the 
Second Circuit’s decision in United States v. Aluminum Com-
pany of America (Alcoa).65 This monopolization case, which 
proved to be the single most important guide to the law govern-
ing dominance for at least forty years,66 concerned the actions 
of an exceptionally successful company in the aluminum busi-
ness.67 Alcoa’s innate success got it in trouble when the U.S. 
Justice Department charged the company with illegal monopo-
lization and sought its dissolution.68 In 1945, Judge Learned 
Hand wrote an opinion that might be considered—at least by 
some—as something of a blemish on his otherwise outstanding 
record.69 He reasoned that Alcoa was guilty under section 2 of 
the Sherman Act because it had “progressively . . . embrace[d] 
each new opportunity as it opened, and . . . face[d] every new-
comer with new capacity already geared into a great organiza-
tion.”70 While at first blush this might appear to be an apt de-
scription of predatory conduct, a more scrutinizing view reveals 
otherwise. Under this reasoning, the Second Circuit had in ef-
fect rendered active competition by a dominant company ille-
gal. According to Judge Learned Hand, a monopolist violated 
the Sherman Act when it expanded output to meet unsatisfied 
demand.71 Yet this is precisely the conduct deemed desirable by 
efficiency-based economics.72 Ironically, the holding of Alcoa is 
 
 64. As explored at length below, patents and other forms of exclusivity do 
not necessarily serve to quash competition. Rather, they deflect that competi-
tion to another forum. In the case of patents, competition is shifted away from 
rivalry in the production and marketing of competitive goods to the laboratory, 
where investment takes place in research and development. See infra Part III.B. 
 65. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). 
 66. See Sara M. Biggers et al., Intellectual Property and Antitrust: A Com-
parison of Evolution in the European Union and United States, 22 HASTINGS 
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 209, 268 (1999). 
 67. See Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 421. 
 68. See id.  
 69. See Richard A. Epstein, Monopolization Follies: The Dangers of Struc-
tural Remedies Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 205, 
210–14 (2009). 
 70. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 431. 
 71. See id. at 424–26.  
 72. Fortunately, it is widely recognized today that sound antitrust policy 
should hinder vigorous competition on the part of any sellers, including mono-
polists. See, e.g., R.W. Int’l Corp. v. Welch Food, Inc., 13 F.3d 478, 488 (1st Cir. 
1994) (“It is in the interest of competition to permit dominant firms to engage 
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in irreconcilable tension with the famous and oft-quoted re-
mark of Judge Learned Hand in the very same case, that “[t]he 
successful competitor, having been urged to compete, must not 
be turned upon when he wins.”73 
B. ANTITRUST DOCTRINE AND THE WARREN COURT 
In the lead up to the 1960s, antitrust doctrine adhered to 
the so-called S-C-P paradigm, which found a nefarious connec-
tion between market structure, improper conduct (which was 
thought to be facilitated by industry structure), and unusually 
high levels of return (performance).74 The resulting doctrine, 
which might fairly be characterized as striking a populist note, 
arguably reached its high mark in the 1960s.75 During this 
time, the Warren Court embraced a highly interventionist 
reading of the Clayton and Sherman Acts, employing the Acts 
to strike down many mergers with de minimis market effects 
and finding a host of business practices to be per se illegal.76 
The case law of the Warren Court provides powerful in-
sight into what the Justices of the time viewed as being anti-
competitive and hence objectionable under the antitrust laws. 
Perhaps most notable during this era was the Court’s hostility 
to efficiency as a goal of the Sherman Act.77 Indeed, the Court 
viewed enhanced efficiency as antithetical to the purpose of the 
antitrust laws when it cemented the market position of compa-
nies perceived to be dominant.78 It is clear during Earl War-
ren’s tenure that anticompetitive was indeed synonymous with 
reduced levels of active competition, defined as the number of 
entities engaging in viable competition.79 Such unconstrained 
competition was seen to yield a panoply of benefits, including 
 
in vigorous competition, including price competition.” (quoting Atl. Richfield 
Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 341 (1990))).  
 73. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 430. 
 74. See Herbert Hovenkamp, United States Competition Policy in Crisis: 
1890–1955, 94 MINN. L. REV. 311, 346–59 (2009). 
 75. See Giocoli, supra note 22, at 756 (observing that “[t]he zenith of SCP-
style antitrust law came in the 1960s”). 
 76. See Daniel A. Crane, Rules Versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudica-
tion, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 49, 103 n.206 (2007). 
 77. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 580 (1967). 
 78. See id.  
 79. See Thomas E. Kauper, The “Warren Court” and the Antitrust Laws: 
Of Economics, Populism, and Cynicism, 67 MICH. L. REV. 325, 330–32 (1968). 
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freedom of choice on the part of consumers, liberal access to 
markets by prospective sellers, and dispersion of power.80  
As a result, the Court condemned entire swathes of com-
mercial conduct deemed inimical to these goals. The Court 
summarily struck down resale price maintenance, even where a 
manufacturer purported only to set a maximum price at which 
its dealers could sell to the public.81 The Court looked with even 
greater disdain on tying arrangements,82 which the Justices 
viewed as giving rise to monopoly leverage and restricted 
access to markets and products for consumers and competitors 
alike.83 Exclusive dealing contracts were viewed similarly.84 
Prices set by large companies that were deemed at all “predato-
ry” were condemned, notwithstanding the significant benefits 
to consumers of low prices.85 Group boycotts and concerted re-
fusals to deal were eliminated without reference to the ultimate 
effect of such practices on consumers or other groups.86 The ex-
change of price information between horizontal competitors 
was judged to be necessarily illegal.87 And even a joint venture 
amongst fringe rivals in a market to create a name brand with 
which to compete against larger competitors was struck down 
as illegal per se by virtue of the ancillary restraints that the 
venture imposed.88 
The preceding forms of commercial behavior that the Su-
preme Court condemned shared a common theme—they ap-
peared to restrict free competition in some manner. The degree 
to which the restrictions would harm consumers or frustrate 
entry by competitors was deemed irrelevant—at least implicit-
ly—for an unhindered process of rivalry was seen by the War-
ren Court as paramount.89 This approach to antitrust reflected 
 
 80. See id.  
 81. See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 153–54 (1968). 
 82. Product tying occurs when a seller conditions the sale of a product or 
service (“the tying product”) on the purchase of a second product or service 
(“the tied product”). See Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 394 n.5 (1947). 
 83. See id. at 395–96; United States v. Loew’s, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 47–48 (1962). 
 84. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 321 (1966) 
(holding that exclusive dealing “conflicts with the central policy of both § 1 of 
the Sherman Act and § 3 of the Clayton Act”). 
 85. See Utah Pie Co. v. Cont’l Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 694–703 (1967). 
 86. See Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959). 
 87. See United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333, 337–38 (1969). 
 88. See United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 357–58 (1967).  
 89. See Crane, supra note 76, at 103.  
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what has been called a “competition equality” model of popu-
lism.90  
But if the preceding per se rules adopted by the Court can 
be questioned from an economic perspective, the Justices’ mer-
ger rulings were completely irreconcilable with such an ap-
proach. In Von’s Grocery Store, the Court found the merging 
parties’ occupying a mere 7.5 percent of the market to be objec-
tionable.91 And in Brown Shoe, the Court found that a prospec-
tive merger that would yield a firm with only five percent of the 
market violated the Clayton Act.92 Such market shares would 
grant to their possessors no economic power over the market-
clearing price.  
The Court’s holdings in Von’s Grocery Store and Brown 
Shoe cannot be reconciled with an economic-efficiency ap-
proach.93 But of course the Justices of the time were concerned 
with goals beyond efficiency,94 and this is the fundamental 
point.95 “Anticompetitive” need not be synonymous with eco-
nomic efficiency, which is but one interpretation of the goals of 
the antitrust laws.96 And it is important to note that the rela-
tive weight to be placed on the various objectives of competition 
policy will vary depending on the context. For instance, at a 
time of reduced international competition, which might yield 
 
 90. See E. Thomas Sullivan, The Economic Jurisprudence of the Burger 
Court’s Antitrust Policy: The First Thirteen Years, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 1 
(1982). 
 91. See United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 271, 276 (1966). 
 92. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 343–46 (1962). Brown 
Shoe is often cited today for its applauded assertion that antitrust law protects 
competition rather than competitors. Id. at 320. Those citing the decision often 
miss the irony that the outcome in Brown Shoe was antithetical to this as-
serted principle. 
 93. Judge Posner has colorfully characterized the antitrust jurisprudence 
of the Warren Court era as an “intellectual disgrace.” See RICHARD A. POSNER, 
ANTITRUST LAW, at viii (2d ed. 2001). 
 94. See Alan Devlin, Antitrust in an Era of Market Failure, 33 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 557, 565–66 (2010) [hereinafter Era of Market Failure]. 
 95. Although the antitrust jurisprudence of the Warren Court was ana-
thema to many economists, it may in fact have been the most faithful to con-
gressional intent. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: 
THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 76 (3d ed. 2005) (noting that the 
legislative history does not support efficiency-based goals). Since the Sherman 
Act is a common-law statute, however, original legislative intent—assuming 
that it can even be discerned with any accuracy—is of little, if any, importance. 
Congress clearly left it to the judiciary to define the substance of the antitrust 
laws. See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof ’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978). 
 96. See Era of Market Failure, supra note 94, at 566. 
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less pressure on countries to become more efficient for the sake 
of global competitiveness, it may be more reasonable to ad-
vance noneconomic goals. But as the cost of losing economies of 
scale and scope grows, perhaps in light of a developing econom-
ic context that requires greater efficiency, it may no longer be 
deemed acceptable to stifle efficiency in favor of other social 
goals.97  
In traditional industrial settings, it is sometimes possible 
to square such sociopolitical goals as dispersion of economic 
power with efficiency-based concerns, for a vigorous process of 
competition will tend to yield both.98 Fierce rivalry between a 
large number of firms ensures that dominance on the part of 
any one will be constrained and will also result in higher out-
put.99 Active competition promises lower prices, which is surely 
consistent with congressional intent in enacting the 1890 
Act.100 It is only when a tension emerges between concentration 
and efficiency that problems arise. The Warren Court may have 
failed to realize that such a tension is capable of emerging. 
Crucially, however, that tension is apt to arise more frequently 
and acutely today, especially in the context of innovation mar-
kets.101 It is for this reason that modern antitrust law must be 
cautious in tying the definition of “anticompetitive effect” to an 
absence of competition, for restrained competition, higher pric-
es, and market concentration can paradoxically lead to overrid-
ing social benefits in at least some contexts.102 This is most 
likely to be the case in the new-economy setting.  
 
 97. It might also be noted that, during the Warren Court era, the tension 
between efficiency and sociopolitical goals of containing concentration was less 
extreme than it is today, where new economy markets play a role of ever-
increasing importance. See id. at 573–75.  
 98. This is not to say, of course, that the concentration-inhibiting rules of 
the Warren Court did not carry efficiency costs, for the prohibition of mergers 
that would not yield heightened market power serves to inhibit the attainment 
of cost savings and other efficiencies. See id. at 569.  
 99. See generally MCCONNELL & BRUE, supra note 3, at 460–83 (explain-
ing monopolistic competition). 
 100. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 95, at 50–51. 
 101. See Posner, supra note 43, at 931–36. 
 102. Nevertheless, as we explain below, there may be a strong basis for 
treating conduct that explicitly eliminates competition as inimical to the anti-
trust laws, without further reference to ultimate downstream effects. See infra 
Part II.A. 
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C. AFTER THE WARREN COURT 
The jurisprudence of the Warren Court is now considered 
discredited by those of an economic persuasion.103 Beginning in 
the late 1970s, the Chicago School emerged with extraordinary 
influence in the antitrust field, bringing with it an unyielding 
focus on economic analysis as the sole relevant tool of antitrust 
scrutiny.104 The School succeeded in convincing the courts and 
enforcement agencies that political concerns such as limiting 
concentration and ensuring ease of access to markets were in 
themselves irrelevant and, indeed, often diametrically opposed 
to the only relevant factor, which is efficiency.105 This influence 
was most dramatically demonstrated by a number of leading 
decisions of the Burger Court, which discarded its predecessor’s 
populist conception of anticompetitive effect in favor of strin-
gent economic analysis focused on a measure of efficiency.106 In 
doing so, it rejected the structuralist approach.107  
The turning point for this change of direction lay in the 
Supreme Court’s 1977 decision in GTE Sylvania.108 There, the 
Burger Court jettisoned the dogmatic use of per-se-illegal anal-
ysis that had defined its predecessor and employed rule-of-
reason analysis to demonstrate that vertical, non-price-based 
restraints were not necessarily illegal, due to their ability to 
spur interbrand competition.109 A series of revolutionary deci-
sions followed. In Professional Engineers, the new Court clari-
fied that antitrust inquiry under the rule of reason “focuses di-
rectly on the challenged restraint’s impact on competitive 
conditions.”110 In BMI, the plaintiff alleged that the issuance of 
blanket licenses to copyright-protected songs by BMI and 
 
 103. See C. Paul Rogers III, The Antitrust Legacy of Justice William O. 
Douglas, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 895, 943–44 (2008). 
 104. See Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 
U. PA. L. REV. 925, 931–32 (1979). 
 105. Although Chicago’s historical fidelity to the intent of Congress is ques-
tionable, the normative case for granting efficiency hegemonic status is com-
pelling. For perhaps the strongest effort to tie congressional intent in 1890 to 
concerns of economic efficiency, see BORK, supra note 19, at 50–71. 
 106. See E. Thomas Sullivan & Robert B. Thompson, The Supreme Court 
and Private Law: The Vanishing Importance of Securities and Antitrust, 53 
EMORY L.J. 1571, 1604–05 (2004). 
 107. See Jessica Jackson, Note, Much Ado About Nothing? The Antitrust 
Implications of Private Equity Club Deals, 60 FLA. L. REV. 697, 704 (2008). 
 108. See Cont’l T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
 109. Id. at 52–59. 
 110. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof ’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978). 
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ASCAP, the industry’s two largest companies, constituted ille-
gal price-fixing.111 The Supreme Court declined to adopt a per 
se rule of illegality, as its predecessor had been inclined to 
do.112 Instead, it analyzed the challenged arrangement under 
the rule of reason, ultimately finding it to be lawful as the sole, 
lawful way for copyright holders to protect their property 
rights.113 
Having largely adopted the Chicago School’s view that an-
titrust law should be concerned with maximizing consumer 
welfare, the Supreme Court has reversed course on a vast array 
of per se rules. The Court has clarified that even predatory, be-
low-cost pricing by dominant companies is not illegal, absent a 
further showing that the challenged conduct carries with it a 
“dangerous probability” of recoupment.114 Price squeezes are no 
longer necessarily illegal.115 A dominant firm’s obligation to 
deal with its rivals has been narrowed to the point that some 
question its ongoing relevance.116 The per se rule against verti-
cally imposed maximum and minimum resale prices has been 
overruled.117 Outright condemnation of product tying has been 
reversed.118 To prevail on a claim of bundling or requirements 
contracts, a plaintiff must now show that the tying firm has 
monopoly power in the tying market and that the arrangement 
promises to foreclose a substantial volume of commerce in the 
tied market.119 
 
 111. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 6, 15 (1979). 
 112. Id. at 6–7.  
 113. Id. at 16, 24–25. 
 114. See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 
209, 224 (1993).  
 115. See Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109, 
1119–20 (2009).  
 116. See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 
540 U.S. 398, 407–11 (2004). The Supreme Court did emphasize, however, 
that it did not overrule its earlier decision in Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen High-
lands Skiing, 472 U.S. 585 (1985). Instead, it clarified that the decision consti-
tuted the outer boundary of section 2 liability for refusals to deal. Id. at 409. 
 117. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 
886–89 (2007); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 7, 22 (1997).  
 118. Compare Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 44 (2006) 
(holding that “a patent does not necessarily confer market power”), with Jef-
ferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 13–17 (1984) (holding that 
“if the Government has granted the seller a patent or similar monopoly over 
the product, it is fair to presume that the inability to buy the product else-
where gives the seller market power”). 
 119. See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 15–16.  
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More recently, the Court has explained the purpose of the 
antitrust laws is to correct market failures.120 This characteri-
zation is interesting because the purported failure lies not in 
any inherent trait of the market, but in the actions of those en-
tities that occupy it. In this respect, the Sherman Act might 
better be thought of as a mechanism for preventing those with 
an interest in doing so from hindering the otherwise effective 
functioning of the market. Nevertheless, use of the antitrust 
laws as a corrective device to alleviate shortcomings more 
quickly and effectively than would free-market processes oper-
ating alone tells us little about what constitutes a “failure.” It is 
with this fundamental concept that this Article is concerned.  
One can thus observe a dramatic arc in the definition of 
“anticompetitive” conduct. During the Sherman Act’s 120-year 
reign, the fundamental concept of what that legislation pro-
scribes has proven highly unstable. It has unquestionably been 
an evolving concept—one that mirrors the prevailing political 
mood of the day.121 Still, “anticompetitive effect” is arguably 
more determinate a concept in the present than in any time in 
the past.122 It has become clear that the antitrust laws are not 
concerned with dispersing economic power, at least until the 
2008 credit crisis.123 
Yet, even today, the concept of objectionable, “anticompeti-
tive” conduct remains disturbingly ill-defined. While it is in-
deed true that rules govern some conduct—for instance, hori-
zontal price-fixing and market-sharing agreements are illegal 
per se124—and that vast swathes of other conduct are assessed 
under the rule of reason to measure how they comport with no-
tions of economic efficiency, centered in particular on consumer 
welfare, significant questions remain unanswered. In particu-
 
 120. Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458 (1993). 
 121. Prevailing political mood also played an important role in the rise of 
the Chicago School, since its emergence largely coincided with a rightward 
movement during the 1980s. Ronald Reagan’s appointment of leading con-
servative judges helped to cement the adoption of Chicago principles within 
the law. See, e.g., Eleanor M. Fox, What Is Harm to Competition? Exclusionary 
Practices and Anticompetitive Effect, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 371, 379 (2002); Gary 
Minda, Antitrust at Century’s End, 48 SMU L. REV. 1749, 1769 (1995). 
 122. See Fred S. McChesney, Talking ’Bout My Antitrust Generation: Com-
petition for and in the Field of Competition Law, 52 EMORY L.J. 1401, 1402, 
1407 (2003). 
 123. See Era of Market Failure, supra note 94, at 563.  
 124. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940) 
(quoting Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 458 (1940)). 
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lar, should antitrust law analyze conduct under a total-welfare 
standard? Can conduct found objectionable under the relevant 
standard be revived by pointing to long-run, beneficial conse-
quences of that behavior? Should actions that result in demon-
strable price increases be condemned without inquiry into the 
effect of that behavior on market output? Perhaps most funda-
mentally of all, can injury to the competitive process in itself 
suffice to establish an antitrust violation without engaging in 
further analysis to determine the ensuing impact on consumer 
or total welfare? Although these issues will not arise in every—
or even most—cases, they remain fundamental, and their reso-
lution will have a determinative impact on the outcome of at 
least some antitrust lawsuits. We now seek to answer these 
questions. 
II.  DEFINING “ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECT”   
As the preceding section explained, the nature of the con-
duct proscribed by the Sherman Act has evolved in tandem 
with the larger sociopolitical climate of which antitrust policy is 
merely a part. Today, however, there is widespread agreement 
about what is anticompetitive, and hence objectionable, under 
the antitrust laws. The view is one based in economics and fo-
cused, for the most part, on “consumer welfare.”125 Representa-
tively, Fred McChesney proclaims that “[a]nticompetitive now 
is clearly defined as that which raises price, restricts quantity, 
or lowers quality.”126 His is not a controversial view.127 Yet, 
while this definition of objectionable conduct may find wide-
spread agreement, it is not sufficiently precise for the purpose 
of larger antitrust analysis.  
 
 125. See, e.g., Hamilton Chapter of Alpha Delta Phi, Inc. v. Hamilton Coll., 
128 F.3d 59, 63 (2d Cir. 1997); Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., 
Inc., 899 F.2d 951, 960 (10th Cir. 1990); Monahan’s Marine, Inc. v. Bos. Whal-
er, Inc., 866 F.2d 525, 528 (1st Cir. 1989); Ball Mem’l Hosp., Inc. v. Mut. Hosp. 
Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1333 (7th Cir. 1986).  
 126. McChesney, supra note 122, at 1407. 
 127. See, e.g., Wallace v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 467 F.3d 1104, 1107 (7th 
Cir. 2006) (explaining that “the goal of antitrust law is to . . . keep prices low 
for consumers’ benefit”); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 
1294, 1304 (11th Cir. 2003) (defining as “anticompetitive” those practices that 
“diminish output and raise prices”); see also 10 PHILLIP E. AREEDA ET AL., 
ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR 
APPLICATION ¶ 1780a (1996) (explaining that antitrust condemns practices “tend-
ing to restrict output and elevate prices and profits above the competitive level”). 
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In particular, is it indeed the case that conduct which re-
sults in higher prices but not lower quantity violates the anti-
trust laws? How should the courts approach restrictions that 
raise price and depress output in the present, but yet are said 
to promote innovation or otherwise to yield offsetting benefits? 
Perhaps most fundamentally of all, this proffered definition 
does not address the extent to which conduct must be tied to fi-
nal consequences in the form of price and output. So, for in-
stance, are restrictions on the buyer-side of the market objec-
tionable when such restraints cannot be directly tied to 
downstream price effects?128 Can a defendant’s explicit quash-
ing of competition in a market amount to cognizable anticompet-
itive effect without further inquiry?129 These questions are fun-
damental, and yet conventional wisdom, which definitively 
casts anticompetitive effect in terms of price and output effects, 
does not yield satisfactory answers. 
It is notable that this representative definition of anticom-
petitive effect does not turn on a challenged practice’s impact 
on the nature of competition in a market. For sure, agreements 
restricting competition amongst entities engaged in horizontal 
rivalry surely result in higher prices, reduced quantities of 
goods or services, and potentially lower quality. But the inten-
sity of active competition in a market need not always correlate 
perfectly or even strongly with price, output, or quality. More 
vexingly still, reduced in-market competition may be associated 
with diminished quantity and higher price, yet greater quality. 
This phenomenon is most apparent in new-economy industries 
founded on intellectual property.130 The pharmaceutical indus-
try is likely the paradigmatic example, given that it would 
 
 128. See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 
U.S. 312, 325 (2007) (holding that the first prong of the test to determine pred-
atory bidding requires that “the predator’s bidding on the buy side must have 
caused the cost of the relevant output to rise above the revenues generated in 
the sale of those outputs”).  
 129. See Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 533 (7th Cir. 1986) 
(holding that the “use of monopoly power to preclude . . . competition” to ac-
quire a natural monopoly is in violation of the Sherman Act). 
 130. Vertically intrabrand restraints imposed by a manufacturer on its 
dealers may have similar effects. Those restraints may lead to dealers charg-
ing higher prices than would otherwise be the case, thus yielding “anticompeti-
tive” results. But such restraints may alleviate dealers that engage in active pre- 
and post-sales services of the freeriding that might otherwise plague them, 
thus ensuring higher quality to the consumer, even if it is combined with 
higher prices. And similar intrabrand restraints may in fact trigger offsetting 
interbrand competition, which promises to yield larger consumer benefits. 
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largely cease to exist but for patent protection.131 For this rea-
son, under today’s law a monopolist’s refusal to share its facili-
ties with its rivals will rarely give rise to antitrust liability, 
even if that refusal results in consumers receiving less output 
and paying higher prices.132 Although this effect in the present 
may perhaps be characterized as “anticompetitive,” in a more 
important respect it may be anything but. The right to refuse to 
deal is a hallmark of a property right, which gives incentives to 
research, invest, and commercialize that may yield vastly 
greater consumer benefits than mere low prices and higher 
output in the short run.133 Pursuant to this phenomenon, there 
may be a counter-intuitive relationship between reduced levels 
of active competition and long-term consumer welfare, particu-
larly in the innovation context. 
So, the definition of anticompetitive effect requires more 
than increased prices, diminished supply, or lower quality, 
though these are surely traits that may be deemed undesirable 
from an antitrust-policy standpoint. An important question en-
sues: to what extent can a plaintiff demonstrate anticompeti-
tive impact without reference to output, price, and quality as 
they might impact the ultimate consumer? Put differently, can 
a plaintiff demonstrate injury to the competitive process by 
showing reduced competition alone? 
This Part begins by exploring this crucially important 
question. One of the authors happened to write perhaps the 
seminal opinion dealing with this issue. We begin by discussing 
this case, Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, in which a plaintiff 
sought to establish antitrust injury by showing that the defen-
dants’ actions eliminated competition to obtain a monopoly.134 
No evidence was introduced that the challenged conduct would 
result in heightened downstream prices or reduced output.135 
But nor was evidence introduced establishing that that conduct 
would result in heightened quality, lower prices, or some other 
 
 131. See Benjamin Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patent-
ability, 87 TEX. L. REV. 503, 511 (2009). 
 132. See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 
540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004); see also infra note 244 and accompanying quotation. 
 133. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 3.1 (5th ed. 
1998) (noting that “legal protection of property rights creates incentives to ex-
ploit resources efficiently”). 
 134. Fishman, 807 F.2d at 525. 
 135. Id. at 563 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). 
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benefit to consumers.136 This might appear to counsel indiffer-
ence, but as we now explore, we believe that indeterminate ef-
fects on consumers should not lead the courts to condone con-
duct that axiomatically quashes active competition without a 
concomitant, offsetting benefit. 
A. IS “ANTICOMPETITIVE” COTERMINOUS WITH AN “ABSENCE OF 
COMPETITION”? THE INTRIGUING CASE OF FISHMAN V. ESTATE 
OF WIRTZ 
One possessing a moderate familiarity with the law might 
note that antitrust law prohibits conduct by firms that threat-
ens to disrupt the smooth functioning of the economy. Such a 
person might declare further that an unhindered competitive 
process provides a plethora of benefits that run the gamut from 
lower prices to higher quality for consumers, who are the in-
tended beneficiaries of competition law.137 Such comments 
would not be controversial. Whether behavior that interferes 
with an otherwise unhindered competitive process is appro-
priately challengeable under the antitrust laws, however, is a 
difficult question. There is some precedential value for answer-
ing this inquiry in the affirmative, without regard to demonstra-
ble price and output effects. In this regard, Justice Black gave 
perhaps the definitive account of antitrust policy of his era, 
opining: 
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of eco-
nomic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as 
the rule of trade. It rests on the premise that the unrestrained inte-
raction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our eco-
nomic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the great-
est material progress, while at the same time providing an 
environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic political 
and social institutions. But even were that premise open to question, 
the policy unequivocally laid down by the Act is competition.138 
 
 136. Id. at 537 (majority opinion) (“The defendants here have not suggested 
any procompetitive benefit which will result from the challenged conduct.”); 
see also id. (“[T]here seems to be no way of telling whether IBI or CPSC would 
be a ‘better’ owner from the perspective of basketball fans.”). 
 137. See Brunswick Corp. v. Riegel Textile Corp., 752 F.2d 261, 266 (7th 
Cir. 1984) (“The purpose of the antitrust laws as it is understood in the mod-
ern cases is to preserve the health of the competitive process—which means, 
so far as a case such as this is concerned, to discourage practices that make it 
hard for consumers to buy at competitive prices—rather than to promote the 
welfare of particular competitors.”). 
 138. N. Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958). 
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This articulate description of the role of active competition 
in the antitrust regime is both helpful and largely accurate. 
Competition can be assumed to generate a variety of social 
benefits, such that its elimination similarly can be assumed to 
yield social ills. But a number of crucially important caveats 
are in order. First, a complicating factor is that reduced compe-
tition can mask offsetting gains. For instance, intellectual-
property protection reduces active competition in the market-
place, but greatly enhances it in research and development.139 
Not only is this deflection of competition subtle (and hence po-
tentially vulnerable to being ignored), it is immensely valuable 
to society (which magnifies the cost of ignorance). A further 
complicating factor lies in defining a desirable level of competi-
tion. During the structuralist era, it was erroneously assumed 
that rising concentration meant reduced levels of competi-
tion.140 In fact, economists have subsequently demonstrated 
that even duopolies can be highly competitive and that econo-
mies of scale dictate the optimal concentration of a competitive 
market.141  
With these qualifications in mind, competition-eliminating 
conduct can in itself be fairly said to violate the antitrust laws, 
without further inquiry into the ultimate effect of that conduct 
on downstream price and output. We believe a 1986 opinion of 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Fishman v. 
Estate of Wirtz, provides a particularly helpful context in which 
to explore this issue.142  
In that case, the plaintiffs competed with the defendant, 
Chicago Professional Sports Association, to obtain the Bulls, 
which the district court found to be a natural monopoly in the 
presentation of live professional basketball in Chicago.143 The 
 
 139. See Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual 
Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 993 (1997). 
 140. See William H. Page & John R. Woodbury, Paper Trail: Working Papers 
and Recent Scholarship, 7 ANTITRUST SOURCE 1, 2 (2008), available at http:// 
www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-source/08/08/Aug08-pTrail8=6f.pdf (observing the 
“Warren Court’s strict treatment of mergers in markets that exhibited a trend 
toward concentration”). 
 141. See Timothy F. Bresnahan & Peter C. Reiss, Entry and Competition in 
Concentrated Markets, 99 J. POL. ECON. 977 (1991); Frank H. Easterbrook, 
The Chicago School and Exclusionary Conduct, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
439, 440 (2008); Timothy J. Muris, Economics and Antitrust, 5 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 303, 303–06 (1997). 
 142. Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 143. Id. at 525, 532. 
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trial judge determined that the successful bidders refused to 
lease the relevant sports stadium, which was found to be an 
“essential facility.”144 This effectively cut off all competition for 
acquisition of the professional basketball franchise.145 The 
question of interest was whether competition to obtain a natu-
ral monopoly was protected by the antitrust laws.146 The rele-
vant argument was that substituting one monopolist for anoth-
er has no impact on consumer welfare, such that no antitrust 
liability could ensue.147 One of the authors of the present Ar-
ticle, Judge Cudahy, wrote an opinion for the Seventh Circuit, 
in which he found that the Sherman Act protects the process of 
competition itself, including rivalry to obtain a natural monopo-
ly.148 Specifically, he determined that “the antitrust laws are 
concerned with the competitive process, and their application 
does not depend in each particular case upon the ultimate de-
monstrable consumer effect. A healthy and competitive process 
is presumed to be in the consumer interest.”149 Judge Easter-
brook dissented in strong terms.150 
Fishman is the paradigmatic case in which the ambiguous 
meaning of “anticompetitive” leaves the proper outcome in 
some doubt. There is no question that the case describes an an-
ticompetitive act giving rise to an anticompetitive effect, but 
the case law is not entirely clear whether the correct result is 
liability.151 Liability seems to turn on just how firmly the courts 
have embraced consumer welfare as the limited and exclusive 
criterion of the concerns of the antitrust laws. The dissent cites 
many cases that it reads as requiring a demonstrable showing 
of consumer injury,152 and the majority responds with cases—
leading with Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States153—where 
the court found an antitrust violation in situations where com-
petition for acquisition of a “natural monopoly” was suppressed. 
In Otter Tail, for example, although the Court had no trouble 
finding liability, no consumer injury was evident on the facts 
 
 144. Id. at 530. 
 145. Id. at 533. 
 146. Id. at 531. 
 147. Id. at 533, 535. 
 148. Id. at 536. 
 149. Id. 
 150. See id. at 563–85. 
 151. Id. at 533–36. 
 152. Id. at 564–65. 
 153. 410 U.S. 366 (1973). 
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and the need for such injury was not mentioned by the opin-
ion.154 The opinion implicated consumer welfare neither impli-
citly or explicitly. In fact, the absence of consumer effect was 
specifically pointed out by the dissent.155 There was no doubt, 
in studying cases cited in the Fishman opinion and the dissent, 
that competitive injury to the consumer was an important as-
pect for a plaintiff to claim in ferreting out violations of the an-
titrust laws.156 But, up until Fishman, no case had held that 
there was no violation if anticompetitive acts occurred in the 
acquisition of a natural monopoly and the consequences at the 
retail level were unknown.157 
As has been noted, the purposes and impact of the Sher-
man Act have shifted over its history to implicate larger politi-
cal and economic concerns.158 Thus, consumer injury came to 
the fore as a factor in antitrust analysis when economists, with 
a principal focus on efficiency, assumed a leading role in anti-
trust scholarship. Efficiency supplanted an earlier predominant 
concern with equity and fair play in business dealings.159 As a 
political matter, efficiency appealed to more conservative ob-
servers, who were insistent that the antitrust laws were not 
aimed at “bigness” per se, but only at activities that inhibited 
competition at the retail level. This latter emphasis had a uni-
versal appeal insofar as it sought to optimize the allocation of 
resources in a world of scarcity. It was not difficult to persuade 
believers in the wondrous powers of free markets that competi-
tion at the consumer level should be the sole concern of anti-
trust. But Fishman was an effort to examine the state of the 
 
 154. See id. at 368–72. 
 155. Id. at 388–89 (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 156. Indeed, the Fishman majority noted that “the enhancement of con-
sumer welfare is an important policy—probably the paramount policy—
informing the antitrust laws.” Fisherman, 807 F.2d at 535. 
 157. Most recently, the Supreme Court weighed in on the legality of preda-
tory bidding in upstream markets. Rather than trying to tie reduced input 
prices upstream to any negative impact on consumers downstream, the Court 
simply held that the Sherman Act protects “competition and innovation on the 
buy side of the market.” Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lum-
ber Co., 549 U.S. 312, 324 (2007); see also Gregory J. Werden, Competition, 
Consumer Welfare, & the Sherman Act, 9 SEDONA CONF. J. 87, 92 (2008) (dis-
missing the argument that the legality of Weyerhaeuser’s conduct should have 
turned on a formal assessment of “consumer welfare” effects because such an 
approach would “adopt an unreasonably narrow definition of ‘consumer welfare’ 
and wrongly elevate it from a statutory goal to an operational test for liability”). 
 158. See supra Part I. 
 159. See supra Part I. 
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cases as of 1986 and could not purport to be an in-depth exami-
nation of what ideally should define a violation. And, as we 
have noted, the emphasis of standards under the antitrust laws 
has shifted historically as political concerns have changed their 
focus.160 It is of interest, therefore, that under a total-welfare 
analysis as in Fishman—as opposed to a more limited, exclu-
sive inquiry into the well-being of ultimate downstream con-
sumers—liability, as urged by the majority, might be even 
clearer as the proper outcome. 
In fact, Judge Easterbrook hints at such an approach in his 
treatment of Otter Tail, which is the main citation casting 
doubt on the thesis that consumer injury is an essential ingre-
dient of liability under the Sherman Act.161 Judge Easterbrook 
argues, in effect, that in Otter Tail there was competition in 
generation—upstream from the electricity-delivery process—as 
well as downstream at retail distribution, and that generation 
was potentially affected by the anticompetitive denial of trans-
mission accommodation.162 
Judge Easterbrook thus asserts that the anticompetitive 
use of transmission is significant because the cost of generation 
may ultimately flow through and affect the regulated price to 
consumers.163 His test is, therefore, formally keyed to consumer 
welfare, but in substance relies on his beliefs about aggregate 
welfare.164 In Otter Tail, however, there is no discussion by the 
Court about whether retail prices are in fact affected, or 
whether this was significant or relevant.165 The conclusion to be 
derived from the case may be, then, that anticompetitive acts 
impair welfare and efficiency at some level, and that this is 
enough without need to demonstrate an almost necessarily spec-
ulative relationship to the consumer. Thus, the test itself 
should perhaps be framed in terms of total welfare, rather than 
 
 160. See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
 161. Fishman, 807 F.2d at 571 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). 
 162. Id. (“Otter Tail used its bottleneck to prevent [the retail distributor] 
from receiving the benefit of ongoing competition at the generating level.”).  
 163. Id. 
 164. Notably, Judge Easterbrook connects consumer welfare with allocative 
efficiency, portraying the terms as “cousins” and “close relatives.” He seems to 
believe the two are harmonious, and perhaps even synonymous, goals. Id. at 
567, 570. Yet these two goals can come into inescapable conflict. In the case of 
first-degree price discrimination, for instance, allocative efficiency reaches its 
peak, whereas consumer welfare is zero.  
 165. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973). 
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consumer welfare. Such an approach renders distortions at any 
level in the market—be it upstream or downstream—
objectionable. Judge Easterbrook in his Fishman dissent tries 
to show that the anticompetitive acts in that case probably did 
not affect the consumer.166 This conclusion is necessarily specu-
lation, however, and there is no good reason that the bias of the 
law should be protective of interference with competition when 
all its consequences are unknown.167 Under the antitrust laws, 
the bias should be to protect free markets wherever they can 
exist without attempting to trace the elusive consequences of 
their disruption.168 
Fishman thus illustrates why a total-welfare standard may 
provide a superior vehicle in which to construe the legality of 
competition-eliminating practices that have a tenuous negative 
impact on consumers. A strict consumer-welfare approach 
would ignore blatant distortions, the impact of which cannot re-
liably be traced downstream, though they bear self-evident 
harm to entities upstream. By construing business practices 
through the lens of aggregate welfare, it becomes apparent that 
harm to an excluded competitor may indeed evidence competi-
tive injury, at least when that harm is not matched or exceeded 
by a concomitant gain elsewhere. Of course, in Fishman, one 
could argue that the loss to the plaintiff equaled the gain to the 
party that acquired the stadium. Such a supposition’s accuracy 
cannot be verified without knowing the subjective utility of ac-
quisition to each entity, which would vary depending on the ef-
ficiency with which each could operate the facility. Thus, we 
 
 166. Fishman, 807 F.2d at 571. 
 167. Indeed, it is not the case that consumer benefits could not have flowed 
from the plaintiff ’s acquisition of the stadium in lieu of what ultimately trans-
pired. It could be that the plaintiff would have operated the facility more effi-
ciently than the entity that acquired it, for instance, which would presumably 
inure to the benefit of consumers. An entity that could employ a resource more 
efficiently than others would rationally bid a greater sum than its rivals, cete-
ris paribus, but its superior efficiency would allow it to enjoy greater returns 
at any given price. 
 168. It warrants emphasizing that the law regularly employs presump-
tions, which are justified on the basis that they are more often correct than 
not. It is difficult to envision a presumption more likely to hold true in the vast 
majority of instances than the presumption that competition yields a variety of 
social benefits, including consumer welfare, that will be lost if that competi-
tion is eliminated. The fact that in a small minority of instances the elimina-
tion of competition will not harm consumers hardly warrants a reversal of that 
presumption, particularly if there is no showing that the restriction in compe-
tition does not actually benefit consumers.  
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advocate a total-welfare approach that is all-encompassing in 
its protection. Upstream entities, every bit as much as down-
stream consumers, ought to be entitled to the fruits of a com-
petitive process.169 We believe that such an approach most 
faithfully comports with long-established, and never-overruled, 
Supreme Court precedent.170 
Fishman is therefore a good example of why a total-welfare 
standard may be preferable to one limited to consumer welfare. 
Competition generally produces efficiency at all economic levels 
in which it may take place. Therefore, it seems reasonable to 
reward competition—and sanction its obstruction wherever it 
may be involved, whether at the consumer level or elsewhere. It 
may be possible in individual cases to identify curtailments of 
welfare through impairments of competition at the producer or 
distributor levels, and to determine whether these curtailments 
result in a loss at, for example, the consumer level. This is the 
process by which Judge Easterbrook, for example, seeks to jus-
tify the finding of liability in Otter Tail (even though the Su-
preme Court opinion contains no such analysis).171  
But such an analysis seems speculative, possibly labyrin-
thine, and unnecessary. Is it not simpler and equally justifiable 
to focus on aggregate welfare, thus protecting the process of 
competition in situations where its absence cannot be tied to 
social gains, without attempting to trace all the efficiencies and 
inefficiencies to determine the impact on a particular level? If 
the best that can be said is that elimination of upstream com-
petition may sometimes result in zero improvement in total ef-
ficiency in all markets combined, then illegality in all instances 
strikes us as the appropriate rule. 
Although courts have differed on this question,172 we con-
clude that antitrust plaintiffs need not be required to demon-
strate downstream consumer injury in all cases. Where chal-
lenged conduct explicitly quashes competition in a cognizable 
market, and the relevant restriction is not of the kind that 
 
 169. Accord Werden, supra note 157, at 97. 
 170. Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 
236 (1948). 
 171. Fishman, 807 F.2d at 571 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). 
 172. See, e.g., Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 398–99 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (rejecting as “rigid” a “price or output” rule that would allow 
any commercial behavior not having either such effect to escape antitrust con-
demnation), rev’d in part, vacated in part, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004). 
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lends itself to offsetting benefit, a court may fairly presume an-
ticompetitive effect.  
B. THE FEASIBILITY OF AN AGGREGATE-WELFARE STANDARD 
Much of the debate concerning the precise definition of an-
ticompetitive effect can be traced to the question whether ag-
gregate or consumer welfare is the appropriate benchmark of 
antitrust analysis.173 As the next Part begins by exploring, the 
law is as yet unsettled as to whether a practice that increases 
price but has no effect on output can be challenged under the 
Sherman or Clayton Acts. Similarly, the proper treatment of 
product tying depends very much on whether one adheres to a 
total- or consumer-welfare framework. The choice between 
these two benchmarks is equally important for merger analy-
sis. 
The first question is obvious: what is the difference be-
tween the two models? As the name might suggest, aggregate 
or total welfare refers to the combined wealth of sellers and 
purchasers in a market.174 The model does not differentiate be-
tween wealth in the hands of either group. In contrast, con-
sumer welfare is often, though not exclusively, meant to refer 
to the consumer surplus in a market—that is, the combined dif-
ference between each consumer’s reservation price and the 
price he or she ultimately pays.175 To complicate matters, how-
ever, the term “consumer welfare” is occasionally used in a 
manner synonymous with total welfare.176 When we use the 
term, we shall use it to refer to the economic measure of con-
sumer surplus only. 
This Article does not seek to articulate an unqualified view 
on the relative virtues of adhering to a consumer or total-
welfare paradigm for all purposes, though we believe that the 
 
 173. See, e.g., John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental 
Goal of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency, 84 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 191, 236 n.215 (2008). 
 174. See David Pettit, Submarkets and Supermarkets: FTC v. Whole Foods 
Market and the Resurrection of Brown Shoe, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 971, 979 
n.62 (2009). 
 175. See Brodley, supra note 20, at 1032. 
 176. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 19; see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Distribu-
tive Justice and the Antitrust Laws, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (1982) (dis-
cussing the difficulty of defining “consumer welfare”). 
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aggregate standard is generally to be preferred.177 For one, we 
consider that such an approach comports most closely with the 
one, transcendent principle that has characterized the history 
of U.S. antitrust enforcement—namely, that competition itself 
is of primary concern.178 If one construes the antitrust laws as 
protecting the process of competition, and thus aiding all those 
who stand to benefit from such rivalry, then limiting the law’s 
coverage to downstream consumers alone is incongruous. In 
electing an appropriate lodestar, it is also surely relevant that 
a “consumer-welfare” approach may reduce net societal utility 
in at least some instances. Seeking to maximize cumulative 
wealth in society is hardly an unreasonable objective, yet a con-
sumer-welfare goal is partially inconsistent with it. Moreover, 
even if one’s normative position is based only on consumer well-
being, it remains true that seller-side efficiencies can percolate 
through to individual consumers.179 Capital markets and em-
ployee stock ownership directly facilitate the distribution of 
profits to individuals. In this sense, it may be inaccurate to de-
marcate producers and consumers into two distinct groups that 
are separated by an impermeable barrier through which no 
wealth can flow.180 
Nevertheless, the aggregate-welfare model—if adopted 
without qualification—would carry some controversial reper-
cussions. This is especially so in the merger arena, in which 
courts would nevertheless permit so-called Williamson mergers 
that confer market power at the expense of consumers.181 Oliv-
er Williamson famously demonstrated that mergers that yield 
heightened market power at the expense of consumers, but that 
 
 177. See also Reformulating Antitrust Rules, supra note 25 (advocating the 
adoption of an aggregate-welfare standard). 
 178. See supra Part I. 
 179. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL 
MERGER GUIDELINES § 4 (1992) (rev. 1997) [hereinafter MERGER GUIDELINES] 
(noting that producer-side efficiencies can benefit consumers). 
 180. In addition, it is wholly inaccurate to treat companies that are sellers 
in one market as sellers for all purposes. Such companies are simultaneously 
consumers in others. Why would antitrust law protect them in the latter set-
ting, but not in the former? This point is pursued further below. 
 181. More specifically, Williamson mergers would theoretically be permit-
ted. Whether such combinations would be approved depends on whether the 
merging parties credibly conveyed information about the producer-side effi-
ciencies they envisioned that the merger would achieve. This is notoriously 
difficult in practice, so the legality of Williamson mergers is for the most part 
academic for present purposes. 
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simultaneously create supply-side efficiencies, are likely to en-
hance social welfare even if the efficiency gains are modest.182 
Only the Canadian antitrust authorities currently contemplate 
a complete efficiencies defense of a merger that causes in-
creased prices.183 Williamson mergers do not pass muster un-
der the Justice Department and FTC’s current merger guide-
lines.184 Whether this view is defensible, at least at the 
theoretical level, turns on whether the U.S. agencies ought to 
be concerned with total, rather than consumer, welfare.185 
From a purely normative perspective, however, we believe that 
the desirability of such combinations turns in part on consum-
ers’ access to capital markets, which would allow them to share 
in companies’ wealth. 
Although there may be occasions in which an unwavering 
promotion of aggregate welfare may lead to controversial appli-
cation (or nonapplication) of the antitrust laws, we believe that 
there is good ground to base analysis largely on such a total-
welfare model. The Supreme Court would implicitly seem to 
have adopted at least a variant of it in the monopsony context, 
noting that the Sherman Act  
does not confine its protection to consumers, or to purchasers, or to 
competitors, or to sellers. Nor does it immunize the outlawed acts be-
cause they are done by any of these. The Act is comprehensive in its 
terms and coverage, protecting all who are made victims of the for-
bidden practices by whomever they may be perpetrated.186  
This is a resounding endorsement of the notion that active 
competition is itself the primary goal of the antitrust laws and 
that the distortion of that competition is supposed to carry a 
variety of undesirable consequences.187 If antitrust jurispru-
 
 182. See Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Wel-
fare Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18, 21–23 (1968).  
 183. See Competition Act, R.S.C., 1985 C-34, § 96 (Can.). 
 184. See MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 179, § 4 (“[T]he Agency considers 
whether cognizable efficiencies likely would be sufficient to reverse the mer-
ger’s potential to harm consumers in the relevant market, e.g., by preventing 
price increases in that market.”); see also Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Procter & 
Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 574 (1967) (taking into account the cognizable effi-
ciencies of a merger when finding an acquisition unlawful).  
 185. As a practical matter, it is difficult to identify merger-specific efficien-
cies. They are hard to demonstrate ex ante and even more difficult to separate 
from non-merger-specific efficiencies ex post. 
 186. Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 
236 (1948) (citations omitted). 
 187. See id.; see also MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 179, § 0.1 (stating that 
one purpose of the Guidelines is to “challenge[ ] competitively harmful mergers”).  
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dence looks to the importance of competition above all, the only 
standard by which to give objective meaning to that command 
would seem to be total welfare. For if we look only to a strict 
reading of consumer welfare, we would render the Supreme 
Court’s explicit command meaningless. And, as has been ex-
plored above, one cannot reliably equate antitrust injury to re-
duced competition in all cases, because such reduced rivalry 
may in fact mask offsetting benefits.188 
Aggregate-welfare analysis carries with it an attractive 
harmony, in contrast to the artificial and formalistic nature of a 
literal consumer-welfare standard. It is undeniable that large 
companies that are sellers in one market are extraordinarily 
important consumers in others.189 It is somewhat incongruous 
to give them no importance in the former setting and yet be-
stow hegemonic status on them in the latter. Ultimately, socie-
ty should be concerned first with maximizing societal wealth. 
This is not to say of course that concerns of distribution are un-
important, but it is to emphasize that presumably we would 
like to maximize the size of the pie before we divide it up. 
Finally, a total-welfare approach may be most useful in 
analyzing practices whose impact on consumers is somewhat 
indeterminate, though the net social benefit of the relevant 
conduct may be significant. Product tying190 represents an apt 
example. Although the economics of requirements contracts are 
highly intricate, and certainly beyond the scope of this Article, 
the primary objection to this form of conduct lies in opposition 
to price discrimination.191 It is rarely the case that tying ar-
rangements can be used to “leverage” monopoly power from a 
tying market to an otherwise competitive tied one.192 Such con-
 
 188. Of course, where one can be confident that diminished levels of compe-
tition cannot be tied to an offsetting gain, whether in the present or the future, 
one can properly condemn the challenged restraint. See Fishman v. Estate of 
Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 535–38 (7th Cir. 1986). This was precisely the case in 
Fishman. See supra Part II.A.  
 189. See Reformulating Antitrust Rules, supra note 25, at 271. 
 190. See Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 394 n.5 (1947). 
 191. See Scheiber v. Dolby Labs., Inc., 293 F.3d 1014, 1020 (7th Cir. 2002) 
(“The naive objection [to tying arrangements] is that they extend monopoly; 
the sophisticated objection is that they facilitate price discrimination.”). We 
note in passing that bundling, or “fixed proportions” tying arrangements, 
should rarely be challenged under the antitrust laws. 
 192. See Alan Devlin, A Neo-Chicago Perspective on the Law of Product Ty-
ing, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 521, 532–48 (2007) [hereinafter A Neo-Chicago Perspec-
tive]. 
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duct obviously increases the profit of the tying company—for 
they would otherwise not be imposed—but the net economic 
impact of price discrimination remains uncertain.193 First-
degree price discrimination results in perfect allocative effi-
ciency and zero deadweight loss, but the complete elimination 
of consumer welfare.194 A total-welfare standard would unhesi-
tatingly approve such discrimination, while a consumer-welfare 
approach would be equally quick to condemn it. The efficiency 
impact of more realistic forms of second- and third-degree dis-
crimination remains indeterminate, though there is reason to 
believe that it can be total-welfare enhancing in at least some 
situations.195 Importantly, the welfare effects are more likely to 
be desirable the more accurate the discrimination.196 Require-
ments contracts may operate as unusually precise metering de-
vices.197 For this reason, it might be reasonable to presume that 
tying is more often than not desirable from a total-welfare 
standpoint, particularly in light of the myriad producer- and 
consumer-side efficiencies likely to accompany such arrange-
ments.198 
Notwithstanding the normative case for antitrust’s adop-
tion of a total-welfare standard, it is far from clear that the Su-
preme Court has unreservedly embraced such a lodestar. In 
Brooke Group, for instance, the Court held below-cost pricing 
by a monopolist to be legal in certain situations, notwithstand-
ing its admission that such pricing comes at the cost of efficien-
cy.199 While this might imply reliance on an aggregate-welfare 
 
 193. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Copyright’s Price Discrimination Panacea, 
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 195. See Thomas F. Cotter, The Procompetitive Interest in Intellectual 
Property Law, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 483, 547 (2006); Gianluca Faella, The 
Antitrust Assessment of Loyalty Discounts and Rebates, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & 
ECON. 375, 381 (2008); Jerry A. Hausman & J. Gregory Sidak, Google and the 
Proper Antitrust Scrutiny of Orphan Books, 5 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 411, 
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 198. See David S. Evans, Why Different Jurisdictions Do Not (and Should 
Not) Adopt the Same Antitrust Rules, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 161, 175 (2009). 
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standard, some scholars have argued that the Court has in fact 
been recently guided by a consumer-welfare standard.200 Nev-
ertheless, we believe that a total-welfare standard has the most 
explanatory power, given the Court’s explicit command that the 
Sherman Act protects more than end consumers alone.201 We 
use this interpretation to argue in Part III that output restric-
tions are a sine qua non of an antitrust offense, though we 
would place the burden of demonstrating the absence of such 
an effect on defendants. 
III.  A DEFINITIONAL DILEMMA: ESTABLISHING 
ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECT IN ELUSIVE CASES   
The preceding discussion demonstrated that the funda-
mental concept of “anticompetitive effect” is not fixed, but ra-
ther has evolved quite dramatically over time. Nor does the 
concept now enjoy a clear definition, for considerable uncertain-
ty remains. We have explained that a court can legitimately re-
gard an action as anticompetitive, even when it does not direct-
ly impact consumers. In attempting to inject much-needed 
specificity into the state of being anticompetitive, we have also 
made the case for a total-welfare approach. In this Part, we 
analyze some of the most difficult issues that straddle the inde-
terminate border between pro- and anticompetitive conduct. In 
the first section, we consider the possibility of a practice’s in-
creasing price, but not reducing output. In the second, we ex-
plore the paradoxical fact that anticompetitive conditions today 
may mask procompetitive results in the future. Finally, we note 
the great difficulty involved in measuring the long and short 
run. 
A. MEASURING STATIC EFFICIENCY: THE RELATIVE EFFECT OF A 
PRACTICE ON PRICE AND OUTPUT 
As explored previously, there is at present some uncertain-
ty as to whether contemporary antitrust law is ultimately con-
 
the ground that asking courts to distinguish harmful acts of below-cost pricing 
from at-cost pricing could result in excessive error costs.  
 200. See, e.g., Kirkwood & Lande, supra note 173; see also Einer Elhauge, 
Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly Profit Theory, 
123 HARV. L. REV. 399, 435–36 (2009) (arguing that the Supreme Court fol-
lows an antitrust standard and not a total-welfare standard). 
 201. See Gregory J. Werden, Monopsony and the Sherman Act: Consumer 
Welfare in a New Light, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 707, 722–23 (2007). 
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cerned with consumer or total welfare.202 Although courts and 
commentators typically understand “consumer welfare” to de-
note the combined difference between purchasers’ reservation 
prices and the prices they in fact pay, the Supreme Court expli-
citly lifted the term from Robert Bork’s The Antitrust Paradox, 
which defined the phrase in terms of total welfare.203 Moreover, 
the jurisprudence of the Court governing monopsonistic beha-
vior strongly suggests that downstream consumers are not the 
sole beneficiaries of the antitrust laws.204 For this reason, we 
believe that the Court should embrace the role of aggregate 
welfare more explicitly when it next enjoys an appropriate op-
portunity. 
A fundamental question, which remains unanswered defi-
nitively in the law, is whether courts should condemn a prac-
tice as “anticompetitive” when it results in increased prices but 
no discernible reduction in output. Those affiliated with the 
Chicago School would answer this question in the affirma-
tive.205 Nevertheless, the law remains unsettled, as the very 
few cases to have considered the issue illustrate.  
In Chicago Professional Sports Ltd. v. National Basketball 
Ass’n (Bulls II), Judge Easterbrook opined in dicta that “[t]he 
core question in antitrust is output. . . . A high price is not itself 
a violation of the Sherman Act.”206 This interpretation, which 
would presumably deem elevated prices legal if they did not 
bear the potential to reduce output, has been subtly echoed 
elsewhere. Illustratively, the Ninth Circuit in Rebel Oil Co. v. 
Atlantic Richfield Co. adopted an aggregate-welfare principle, 
holding that “an act is deemed anticompetitive under the 
Sherman Act only when it harms both allocative efficiency and 
 
 202. See supra Part II.B. 
 203. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (quoting BORK, 
supra note 19, at 66).  
 204. See Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 
219, 236 (1948). 
 205. See William H. Page, Legal Realism and the Shaping of Modern Anti-
trust, 44 EMORY L.J. 1, 44 (1995) (describing the Chicago School’s position that 
a “rearrangement of commercial relationships or a change in the dispersion of 
prices is not viewed as anticompetitive unless it affects output in the market”); 
see also Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fix-
ing and Market Division, 75 YALE L.J. 373, 375–76 (1966) (finding that courts’ 
“primary criterion” for violation of the Sherman Act is based on a practice’s 
impact on output). 
 206. Chi. Prof ’l Sports Ltd. v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 95 F.3d 593, 597 (7th 
Cir. 1996). 
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raises the prices of goods above competitive levels or diminishes 
their quality.”207 Nevertheless, this definition of anticompeti-
tive effect is inconsistent with the one adopted by other courts, 
which requires only an increase in price or a decrease in out-
put, but not both.208 
So a fundamental antitrust question has yet to be resolved 
by the courts, though we offer an opinion on the proper path 
forward. Where an identifiable market impact is a predicate of 
demonstrating antitrust injury,209 a plaintiff should be able to 
satisfy her burden by demonstrating price effects alone. The 
burden would then shift to the defendant to prove that the 
identified price effects did not carry, and were not capable of 
carrying, corresponding output restrictions. We envision that 
the number of situations in which a defendant could make such 
a showing would be limited.  
Before proceeding further, though, we must first address 
an important question: to what extent is it possible for an anti-
trust defendant (or defendants) to increase the market price 
without impacting total supply? Courts commonly supposed 
that a seller can increase the price at which it sells its product 
only by reducing output, which artificially enhances the mar-
ket-clearing price.210 This is not true in an unqualified sense, 
however, as virtually every seller in the United States has the 
ability to increase price by at least some modest amount above 
 
 207. Rebel Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1433 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 208. See, e.g., United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 238 (2d Cir. 
2003); Sicor Ltd. v. Cetus Corp., 51 F.3d 848, 854 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 209. We explained above that, in certain limited circumstances, a plaintiff 
may not need to establish downstream effects in order to make out a viable 
antitrust claim. Where competition has been demonstrably quashed, and 
where that elimination of competition cannot be linked to a cognizable social 
benefit, anticompetitive effect should be presumed to exist. At that stage, it 
would be incumbent upon a defendant to prove that the challenged restriction 
did not carry injurious effect. See supra Part II.A. The present section consid-
ers the question of what kind of identifiable market effect can be considered 
“anticompetitive.” 
 210. See, e.g., In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 305 F.3d 145, 152 (3d Cir. 
2002) (explaining that “[a] reduction in supply will cause prices to rise”); 
L.A.P.D., Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Corp., 132 F.3d 402, 404 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting 
that higher prices “occur[ ] when firms with market power curtail output”); 
Sanjuan v. Am. Bd. of Psychiatry & Neurology, Inc., 40 F.3d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 
1994) (explaining that an entity exercises market power by “cutting back out-
put in the market and thus driving up prices”); Chi. Prof ’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. 
Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 961 F.2d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 1992) (observing that “only 
a reduction in output allows producers to raise price”). 
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marginal cost without seeing a noticeable drop in demand.211 
Nevertheless, it remains generally correct that a company can 
charge monopoly prices only by reducing the supply of the mo-
nopolized good made available to consumers.212 This will be the 
case in any market with a downward-sloping demand curve, 
which almost all markets possess.213 In these settings, the im-
position of monopoly prices will necessarily carry with it an 
output restriction, thus counseling antitrust scrutiny under 
both the consumer- and aggregate-welfare models. 
The classic demand curve is illustrated below, as Model (a). 
When such a curve slopes continuously downward, the only 
way for a company to charge a higher price is to make less of its 
product available. This is illustrated by the move from Q1 to Q2, 
which triggers a price increase from P1 to P2. As noted, most 
markets are characterized by downward-sloping demand 
curves, so price increases can generally be assumed to coincide 
with reductions in supply.214  
Nevertheless, there are instances in which significant price 
increases may be possible without triggering an offsetting re-
duction in demand. This can occur when the price rise takes 
place within a vertical portion of a demand curve, which is 
where demand is perfectly inelastic—such demand curves are 
“kinked.”215 Depending on the market, there may be a consi-
derable range of prices within which output may neither drop 
nor rise. This is most unlikely to occur with respect to luxury 
goods, and is more probable with respect to necessities.216 For 
example, imagine a particular drug, which lacks substitutes 
 
 211. See POSNER, supra note 93, at 195. Judge Posner gives the example of 
book publishing, which is a ferociously competitive industry in which all sel-
lers have the ability to set supracompetitive prices (i.e., above marginal cost) 
without seeing a large reduction in demand. Id. He points out that this is a 
form of market power, but that it is of a kind that is “utterly immaterial to an-
titrust policy.” Id. 
 212. See Alan J. Meese, Antitrust Balancing in a (Near) Coasean World: 
The Case of Franchise Tying Contracts, 95 MICH. L. REV. 111, 138 (1996). 
 213. See generally MCCONNELL & BRUE, supra note 3, at 40–45 (explaining 
the law of demand and demand curves). 
 214. See WALTER NICHOLSON & CHRISTOPHER SNYDER, INTERMEDIATE 
MICROECONOMICS AND ITS APPLICATION 14–15 (10th ed. 2007). 
 215. See George J. Stigler, The Literature of Economics: The Case of the 
Kinked Oligopoly Demand Curve, 16 ECON. INQUIRY 185, 188–94 (1978). 
 216. Cf. David W. Opderbeck, Patent Damages Reform and the Shape of 
Patent Law, 89 B.U. L. REV. 127, 131–32 (2009) (observing that necessary 
goods have relatively inelastic demand). 
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and is of critical importance to effective medical treatment. If 
that drug constitutes a small percentage of the overall cost of 
treating a particular set of patients, even a significant percen-
tage increase in price may not result in a reduction in the num-
ber of patients receiving the drug. Model (b), below, illustrates 
how a price increase from P1 to P2 may not have an impact on 
output.  
Nevertheless, there are limits to how far market partici-
pants can raise prices without causing a reduction in demand. 
The most obvious ceiling lies in consumers’ budgetary con-
straints. Quite obviously, one cannot spend more than one has. 
In addition, at a sufficiently high price, almost any good or ser-
vice will be construed by consumers as being substitutable by 
other options. Moreover, if the price of an input into a down-
stream good or service increases sufficiently to become a signif-
icant element of the cost of producing that downstream good or 
service, then further price increases are likely to decrease ulti-
mate downstream demand and, hence, upstream demand for 
the input. In this way, upstream price increases may not result 
in immediate output restrictions, but could have such an effect 
over a longer time frame. This possibility is demonstrated in 
Model (b) where price increases from P2 to P3. 
One can perhaps best explore this principle in the merger 
arena. How should the courts and enforcement agencies treat 
an acquisition that results in increased prices, but not reduced 
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yet caused a reduction in output, but have the potential to 
should prices increase further (as in P2 to P3 in Model (b), 
above)? A 2005 decision of the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) is illuminative. 
In In re Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corp., the FTC 
challenged a consummated merger in which Evanston North-
western Healthcare Corporation acquired Highland Park Hos-
pital.217 Bringing suit for a violation of section 7 of the Clayton 
Act four years after the merger, the FTC contended, and the de-
fendant did not dispute, that prices had increased significantly 
post-consummation.218 The case posed a number of challenging 
issues, but relevant for our purposes is the Commission’s dis-
cussion on the question of output. The defendant argued that 
the FTC had failed to meets its burden by not showing that the 
merger reduced supply in the relevant market.219 In response 
to that contention, the full Commission wrote: 
More fundamentally, respondent incorrectly assumes that there is a 
relatively constant relationship in the hospital market between quan-
tity and price. The record reflects that this is not the case. When 
MCOs negotiate with hospitals, for the most part they are faced with 
an all-or-nothing decision about whether to include the hospital in 
their network because, as Hillebrand testified, it is “very, very diffi-
cult” for an MCO to steer its PPO members to particular in-plan hos-
pitals through differential pricing. . . . Steering also is not an option 
for HMO plans because HMOs charge members uniform rates for all 
hospitals in their networks and preclude members from using other 
hospitals. Thus, generally, output declines only after the hospital ex-
ceeds the price at which the MCO is willing to enter into any contract 
with the hospital, at which point the output drops very substantially. 
In other words, there is a substantial range of prices, including prices 
at supracompetitive levels, over which an MCO will decide to include 
a hospital in its networks without a material change in the level of 
the hospital’s services demanded by the MCO. The fact that complaint 
counsel did not prove a drop in market-wide output thus is not a defi-
ciency in complaint counsel’s case.220 
The FTC’s ruling here is of considerable importance. This 
is not only because it constitutes one of the most direct assess-
ments of the output-versus-price distinction for the purpose of 
 
 217. In re Evanston Nw. Healthcare Corp., No. 9315, 2005 WL 2845790, 
§ I.A (F.T.C. Oct. 20, 2005), aff ’d in part, vacated in part, 2007 WL 2286195, 
§ I (F.T.C. Aug. 6, 2007). 
 218. Complaint at 5, In re Evanston Nw. Healthcare Corp., 2005 WL 
2845790 (F.T.C. Feb. 10, 2004) (No. 9315), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/ 
caselist/0110234/040210emhcomplaint.pdf. 
 219. In re Evanston, 2007 WL 2286195, § V.C.3.b. 
 220. Id. 
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identifying an antitrust violation. It is also because the FTC is 
an expert agency, whose view should be entitled to significant 
respect. The substance of its holding strikes us as largely cor-
rect. Economists may be indifferent to a static state of affairs in 
which a merger creates a wealth transfer but no allocative or 
productive distortions. However, one might fairly challenge a 
situation in which a merger drains consumer wealth without 
any concomitant social benefit.221 It is not the case, for in-
stance, that the defendant proved that increased merger prices 
carried offsetting advantages. Defendants in other cases might 
be able to show that the wealth transfer facilitated procompeti-
tive investment in other markets or resulted in other efficien-
cies. Like the FTC, we would not put the burden of establishing 
an output restriction on an antitrust plaintiff. Since significant 
price increases will almost always result in, or from, dimi-
nished output due to the downward-sloping nature of most de-
mand curves, presuming reduced supply from a demonstrated 
price rise is a most reasonable heuristic.  
More fundamentally however, even adopting an aggregate-
welfare standard, the defendant could not point to an increase 
in total welfare. Rather, it could merely contend that the chal-
lenged acquisition left undisturbed that welfare. The FTC, on 
the other hand, found that the price rise may have taken place 
within the vertical portion of the relevant demand curve (see 
supra Model (b) between P1 and P2, for instance).222 But it was 
at pains to emphasize that the purported absence of an output 
restriction was the result of chance, for had the price risen even 
slightly higher, there may have been a catastrophic drop in 
supply.223 Another way to think of this determination is that 
the merger carried with it a “dangerous probability” of an out-
put restriction.224 Courts have long deemed such a showing ac-
ceptable to establish a violation of section 2’s attempted-
monopolization prong.225 Although it may be a somewhat more 
complicated issue in the case of a consummated merger, as the 
 
 221. Indeed, one might say that price increases not accompanied by offset-
ting gains can be condemned on account of the fact that quality-adjusted out-
put has in fact fallen. The authors would like to thank Professor Michael Ja-
cobs for bringing this insight to their attention. 
 222. In re Evanston, 2007 WL 2286195, § V.C.3.b. 
 223. Id. 
 224. See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 
209, 224 (1993). 
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competitive impact of the merger should be provable at that 
stage,226 demonstrated monopoly prices coupled with a showing 
that output restrictions were and remain probable should suf-
fice. It would seem (though of course it is impossible from our 
vantage point to know) that the defendant in Evanston would 
have been unable to prove in defense that its price increases 
were incapable as a matter of fact of resulting in diminished 
supply. 
The crucial question—it seems to us—is whether height-
ened prices, absent an output restriction, can be shown to yield 
social benefits. If not, then they should be condemned, if dura-
ble and shown to emanate from challenged conduct by a domi-
nant firm, acquirer, or group of companies operating in un-
ison.227 But if a defendant can show that the increased prices 
carried some cognizable social benefit, such as facilitating 
cross-subsidization of R&D or other desirable and nonabstract 
activities, and that there was no output restriction, it should 
escape antitrust liability. 
We consider one other interesting possibility. How should 
the law treat an acquisition that does not result in enhanced 
market power, but nevertheless yields significantly higher pric-
es? This might seem paradoxical, for one might fairly assume 
that every company will set price at profit-maximizing levels.228 
But one feature of capital markets is that money will flow to re-
sources that are being under-utilized. If venture capitalists or 
others observe companies whose management is not setting op-
timal prices, acquisitions will inevitably follow. One possibility 
is that the original owner may have been constrained by repu-
tational factors or simply been ignorant of the price the market 
would have supported.  
Our conclusion is straightforward. There is nothing wrong 
from an antitrust perspective about a company acquiring an 
under-priced asset and setting price at the profit-maximizing 
 
 226. See United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 501 (1974). 
 227. The durability point is key, for ephemeral market distortions are not 
properly within the purview of the antitrust laws. See, e.g., Colo. Interstate 
Gas Co. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 885 F.2d 683, 695–96 (10th Cir. 1989); 
Dimmitt Agri Indus., Inc. v. CPC Int’l, Inc., 679 F.2d 516, 530 (5th Cir. 1982). 
 228. In other words, one might doubt the possibility of such an acquisition 
yielding an appreciable price rise because, if demand at the pre-acquisition 
price were inelastic, the original owner would have already set the price at a 
higher level. 
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level.229 In such a situation, the acquisition has not enhanced 
the level of market power; it has merely facilitated profit-
maximizing pricing. Setting price at market levels can act as an 
important signaling mechanism to the market, which can at-
tract entry where none would otherwise take place, and can 
make further funds available to the acquiring entity to devote 
to cross-subsidization of other projects or to improving infra-
structural support for the acquired good.230 Were the courts to 
embroil themselves in disputes over acquisitions that did not 
quash competition or create additional market power, they 
would not only inject unwelcome levels of uncertainty into ac-
quisition decisions—they would deputize themselves as price-
regulatory agencies. This is something that courts should defi-
nitely not do.231 
B. DYNAMIC EFFICIENCY AND THE PARADOXICAL CONCEPT OF 
COMPETITION 
“Competition” often conjures up an image of a host of sel-
lers vying with one another for customers’ attention. Haggling 
with a vendor over price terms at a market fair, with other sel-
lers offering similar products as far as the eye can see, is per-
haps the paradigmatic example. The economist’s notion of “per-
fect competition,” which constitutes the holy grail of antitrust 
policy,232 envisions a comparable environment. It requires a 
large number of sellers offering homogeneous goods, a similarly 
large number of purchasers, free entry and exit, and no trans-
action costs.233 The markets never realize such conditions in 
practice, of course, though certain markets for securities come 
 
 229. For a controversial view against this position, see generally J. THOMAS 
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close.234 But the model of perfect competition is the starting 
point of much antitrust analysis.235 In many ways, this is a 
formal model of behavior that approximates the hustle and 
bustle of the large, open-market fair just described. 
Such competition is of course to be desired. The purpose of 
the Sherman and Clayton Acts therefore appears straightfor-
ward. Antitrust might reasonably be thought of as a system 
that protects a vigorous process of rivalry, perhaps of the kind 
that most people might envision when thinking of competition. 
It would hardly do if the hypothetical fair became monopolized, 
such that only a single vendor catered to the crowd of prospec-
tive purchasers. For that reason, monopoly is viewed (usually 
correctly) as the prime evil at which the antitrust laws are di-
rected.236 As explained above, perfect competition yields alloca-
tive and productive efficiency in the long run, while monopoly 
results in deadweight loss and wealth transfers.237 A chal-
lenged practice is therefore “anticompetitive” if its effect is to 
shift the market-clearing point further away from the perfectly 
competitive optimum and toward short-run equilibrium under 
monopoly.238 
Although this characterization is reasonably accurate in 
most applications, it is seriously misleading insofar as it is pre-
sented as an unqualified principle.239 There emerges a counter-
intuitive, but potentially crucial, tension between perfect com-
petition and long-run welfare. In particular, there may be a re-
lationship between supracompetitive returns and innovation.240  
 
 234. See West v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 282 F.3d 935, 939 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 235. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 95, at 2–3.  
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This relationship is not yet fully understood and has been 
subject to considerable, and so far unresolved, debate in the 
academic literature.241 Nevertheless, there is at least some rea-
son to think that an antitrust system that attempted to elimi-
nate monopoly in all its forms would be a destructive tool of 
public policy. Dominance may be thought of as the proverbial 
pot of gold at the end of an unforgiving process of competi-
tion.242 Monopoly, if earned through innovation, business acu-
men, or rugged entrepreneurship, is a crucial determinant of 
long-run incentives. If one takes away the prize for winning, 
companies are left with scant incentive to undertake the risky 
and cut-throat path of competition. The judiciary has long rec-
ognized the importance of preserving the drive to win. In 1945, 
Judge Learned Hand famously declared that the dominant 
firm, “having been urged to compete, must not be turned upon 
when [it] wins.”243 More recently, the Supreme Court in 2004 
framed monopoly in laudatory terms, explaining: 
The mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charg-
ing of monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an important 
element of the free-market system. The opportunity to charge mono-
poly prices—at least for a short period—is what attracts “business 
acumen” in the first place; it induces risk taking that produces inno-
vation and economic growth.244 
This is all well and good. By recognizing the rights of mo-
nopolists to charge monopoly prices, the courts facilitate a vig-
orous process of competition. The irony, of course, is that all 
companies chase the same prize and, in the process, reach a 
stalemate that results in a competitive market structure. The 
monopoly award therefore becomes an unattainable fiction and 
operates as a key driver of a robust economy.  
A problem conceivably emerges, however, when the process 
of competition, instead of creating a stable, multi-firm equili-
brium, produces a conclusive victor. Even if the law elects not 
to condemn the resulting monopolist for the acquisition of its 
position, antitrust enforcers might be tempted to impose a va-
riety of painful restrictions in the name of preserving, fostering, 
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or perhaps directly inducing a viable process of competition. 
Here the law encounters a serious tension. Either enforcers 
should stand back and allow monopolists to engage in profit-
enhancing practices that may perhaps cement their position or 
they should strictly police monopolistic behavior to curtail price 
gouging of consumers or to prevent competitors’ being crushed 
in their incipiency. To the extent the law succeeds in prevent-
ing exclusionary conduct of the kind that can frustrate entry by 
equally or more efficient firms, it is to be applauded.245 But the 
risk is that antitrust intervention premised on preventing nefar-
ious monopolistic conduct that aims to perpetuate dominance 
may easily exceed its mandate. It is all too easy to mistake pro-
competitive or efficient conduct by the dominant firm for im-
proper, exclusionary behavior, since both forms of behavior can 
disadvantage or injure rivals.246 The lure of attacking genuine-
ly competitive, monopolistic conduct may become irresistible. 
And if one observes an increasing incidence of monopoly in the 
economy, one might understandably begin to yield to this temp-
tation. 
The imprudence of such an approach lies in the possible re-
lationship between monopoly and innovation. In the new econ-
omy, in which technological innovation yields an ongoing varie-
ty of ever-novel products, sequential monopoly may mask 
vigorous competition.247 This competition takes place not in the 
marketplace, as with traditional industries, but in the research 
lab as companies race to outdo one another in technological 
contests. In this world, technological quality matters far more 
to consumers than price and, as a result, dominance may be 
ephemeral.248 Monopoly can persist in such an environment on-
ly if it continues to innovate apace with its fringe rivals.249 But 
it is crucial to allow successful innovators lawfully to displace 
incumbent firms and subsequently to extract monopoly profits 
free from antitrust condemnation.  
 
 245. See POSNER, supra note 93, at 194–95. 
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 247. See POSNER, supra note 93, at 249. 
 248. See Steven C. Salop & R. Craig Romaine, Preserving Monopoly: Eco-
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How do these general considerations translate into identi-
fiable antitrust issues? Perhaps the most important example 
involves monopolists’ right to refuse to license intellectual 
property. If the law respects that right as inviolate, monopoly 
returns and hence the law has preserved incentives to invent. 
But if the law instead allows incursion by rivals into a domi-
nant firm’s intellectual property, the result is diluted incen-
tives, though greater short-run consumer welfare. The norma-
tive question as to which approach is to be preferred is 
somewhat indeterminate, as the following section explains. But 
the point for now is that the question of what behavior is “anti-
competitive” is both elusive and yet of the utmost importance. 
Refusing to license intellectual property that is indispensable 
to viable competition in the market is surely anticompetitive in 
the sense that such a move forecloses competition in the short 
run. Yet, that same refusal may perpetuate a system of incen-
tives that propels a dynamic form of competition in research 
and development, which might fairly be characterized as pro-
competitive. This fact injects yet another complication into the 
threshold, yet essential, question of to what precisely “anticom-
petitive” refers. 
Whether the government should employ the antitrust laws 
to disrupt monopolized markets and inject greater levels of ac-
tive competition turns in part on the debate between Schumpe-
ter and Arrow as to whether competition or monopoly best 
promotes long-run innovation.250 This debate continues to rage 
and the issues involved are complex.251 But although we could 
not attempt to resolve the controversy within the confines of 
this Article, we can certainly observe that a judicial or execu-
tive attempt to force competitive market structures on concen-
trated markets founded on intellectual property or historical 
business acumen would be folly. Moreover, we make an impor-
tant point concerning the policy prescriptions of the Schumpe-
terian view on monopoly and innovation. We are skeptical that 
monopolists who are not subject to competitive pressures from 
fringe rivals or potential entrants would be highly innovative. 
We suspect that biting competitive pressures are required to 
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propel research and development at its realizable rate. Darwin-
ian incentives to survive must surely be the key long-term de-
terminant of high levels of innovation.  
Yet, this view does not mean that the antitrust laws should 
assail successful innovators’ monopolistic positions. Markets 
that were kept at close-to-perfectly competitive conditions 
would not yield the kind of ex post returns necessary to cover 
the costs (magnified by the risk of failure) of ex ante re-
search.252 In this sense, monopoly itself does not yield higher 
levels of innovation, but may itself be a (wholly desirable) re-
sult of highly competitive innovation markets. To dilute mono-
poly may therefore be to take away the prize that spurred the 
arrival of new technologies. Markets that antitrust enforcers 
now wish to render more “competitive” may unintentionally be 
damaged beyond repair in the long run. Thus, it seems self-
evident to us that competition drives innovation,253 but that 
that competition need not take the form that Arrow described. 
If competition in research and development yields valuable in-
novation, which in turn yields monopoly, then that dominance 
may fairly be said to be consistent with competition.254  
C. MEASURING THE LONG AND SHORT RUN 
We now arrive at a final difficult issue, which is a natural 
offshoot of the one we just considered. If there is indeed a 
trade-off between short-run static efficiency and long-run dy-
namic efficiency, this fact has profound repercussions for how 
the law should define anticompetitive effect.255 The problem en-
countered is not conceptual, for most would agree that long-run 
benefits, discounted to present value, should be weighed 
against short-run losses. If the latter costs outweigh former 
gains, then the practice can be condemned as anticompetitive. 
But it is most certainly a practical problem, in that one cannot 
easily quantify the relevant costs and benefits. This leads to an 
indeterminate normative instruction: although we might agree 
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on what is theoretically anticompetitive, we cannot reliably 
identify such conduct in practice. 
The problem emanates from the fact that the beneficial 
long-run gains of controversial practices are at once both uncer-
tain and immeasurable.256 If one believes that robust property 
rights are desirable, so that dominant companies can legiti-
mately refuse to grant access to their competitors, it is because 
one expects the incentives bestowed by strong exclusive rights 
to yield greater levels of innovation in the long run, which will 
outweigh the present-day cost of monopoly. One who adheres to 
a different interpretation—such as the Court of First Instance 
in Europe257—believes (at least implicitly) that the indetermi-
nate long-run boon to innovation is too remote to justify the ills 
monopoly currently inflicts on consumers by monopoly. Neither 
position is demonstrably incorrect, but presumably reflects dif-
fering cultural and sociopolitical experiences.258  
Although this Article provides us an insufficient forum in 
which fully to address the various issues attendant upon com-
paring the long and short run, including the full role of decision 
theory in suggesting superior rules, it is fitting to conclude the 
discussion of anticompetitive effect on the following note: even 
if we have arrived at a sufficiently advanced state of affairs 
that economists and lawyers can reach definitional accord on 
the concept of “anticompetitive effect,” our practical ability to 
identify such effect in practice remains elusive. Since no con-
clusive solution to the epistemological limitations of statistical 
analysis and economic theory appears likely in the near future, 
antitrust law’s profound incongruity remains. No one can speci-
fy precisely what behavior competition ought to condemn in all 
cases. That fact ought to be unsettling. 
  CONCLUSION   
Courts and scholars have long criticized the Sherman Act 
for “its indefinite language, its elusive meaning, and its ambig-
uous charges.”259 We do not believe the statutory language’s in-
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determinate nature to be objectionable, however, as courts 
would seem well placed to bring about doctrinal specificity in 
light of emerging economic and sociopolitical thought. An ab-
stract, but transcendent, principle of the kind found in the anti-
trust statutes might be expected to yield more finely tuned ju-
risprudence than would the legislature’s ex ante demarcation of 
specific rules. Yet, one might reasonably question whether the 
judiciary has succeeded in giving force to Congress’s infamously 
vague command of 1890. At least one scholar has characterized 
antitrust law’s primary mode of analysis as “representing noth-
ing more than a muddled set of platitudes with no meaningful 
standards.”260 Is competition law therefore hopelessly impre-
cise? 
Such a diagnosis might be going too far, for the courts have 
demarcated the boundaries of certain forms of behavior with 
some particularity. For instance, dominant firms can refuse to 
deal with their rivals.261 Cartel activity, such as horizontal 
market sharing and price-fixing, is illegal.262 Yet the Supreme 
Court has retracted numerous rules in recent years, exposing 
increasing swathes of commercial activity to the nebulous scru-
tiny of the rule of reason.263 This Article has explored the sub-
stance of that mode of analytic inquiry, explaining that the ul-
timate issue is a simple one: is the challenged activity 
“anticompetitive”? Unfortunately, the state of being anticompe-
titive is far from straightforward and so U.S. competition law 
remains frustratingly indeterminate. Although consumer wel-
fare, viewed through the lens of efficiency, has emerged as the 
essential determinant of antitrust legality, this analytic lode-
star proves insufficient for many purposes. 
In exploring the elusive, yet fundamental, concept of anti-
competitive effect, we have attempted to inject some specificity 
into a field desperately in need of it. Although intertemporal ef-
fects complicate analysis, we believe that dynamic efficiency 
considerations should largely control in the face of opposing 
static effects.264 Moreover, although “anticompetitive” must be 
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regarded as encompassing more than a lack of in-market com-
petition, conduct that eliminates active rivalry can fairly be 
condemned where no attendant, offsetting benefit is demon-
strated. This holds true even if a plaintiff fails to introduce evi-
dence of downstream effects. Consistent with this interpreta-
tion, we find that an aggregate-welfare approach to competition 
law is generally preferable. For this reason, conduct that is in-
capable of yielding output restrictions should not suffice for the 
purpose of showing an objectionable market impact.265 Further 
evolution along the lines we have suggested would be of signifi-
cant benefit. Nevertheless, in light of our discussion, it ought 
not to be surprising that some threshold uncertainty in the 
substance of antitrust law will remain. That is the necessary 
cost of the legal standard laid down by Congress, which left it 
to the courts to allow the law to evolve in light of contemporary 
theory. 
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